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Every nation in the world aims to keep its military updated with the latest 
technology and equipment required to meet defense challenges. Operational preparedness 
of armed forces takes precedence over comparatively less important functions of 
governance. A significant portion of the defense budget involves operational and 
maintenance expenses, as well as new acquisition expenditures that often require 
complex procurement procedures. These procurements are supported by taxpayers’ 
money, in accordance with relevant procurement laws and regulations of state, and are 
scrutinized by various public and private organizations. Sequestration drives, budget cuts, 
and increased operational and maintenance costs have renewed the emphasis on getting 
the “best value” for taxpayer money. To carry out transparent and efficient use of 
taxpayers’ money, states enact acquisition regulations for public procurement. These 
rules provide guidelines, procedures, and methods for efficient and transparent use of 
public money.   
Pakistan’s military expenditure is around 3.4% of the gross domestic product 
(GDP), amounting to $8 billion in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). The Pakistan defense 
budget includes a significant amount of defense procurement from the United States, 
Pakistan procured $5.4 billion of military hardware through foreign military sales from 
2001 to 2014 (Tomkins, 2015). The Pakistan defense procurement system is under a strict 
requirement to follow the Pakistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) 
rules. PPRA rules govern the public procurement process of Pakistan, which is either a 
single-step process involving just financial proposals or a two-step process involving (a) 
technical negotiations and proposals and (b) financial proposals. Under the existing 
PPRA rules, little or no room exists for financial negotiations, and contracts are awarded 
to the lowest bidder (PPRA, 2004).  
PPRA rules are a manifestation of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL, Nazir & Nadeem, 2015). The Pakistan 
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procurement system lacked the capacity to carry out the financial negotiations process. 
Pakistan addressed the issue of financial negotiations by completely banning the financial 
negotiations process in the PPRA rules. PPRA rules also lack internal control policy 
guidelines and procedures to guide and monitor the financial negotiations process. 
Conducting financial negotiations without a system of internal controls may seriously 
undermine the legitimacy of the process and will likely cast doubts on the legitimacy of 
the negotiation teams themselves. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research study is to analyze the financial negotiations 
processes for public procurement in the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (UK), 
and the United Nations (UN), along with their associated internal controls, to develop a 
guide for Pakistan defense contracting. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to Garrett (2005), “In both public and private sectors, 50 percent to 80 
percent of the total value of procurements are transacted via competitive negotiated 
performance-based contracts” (p. 6). A 2001 Contract Management Institute (CMI) study 
depicted the overall importance of the contract management negotiation skills in both public 
and private sectors (Garrett, 2005, p. 10). One of the most important questions asked was, 
“Which metrics do you believe your organization will use in the next 3 to 5 years to evaluate 
personnel performance?” (Garrett, 2005, p. 10). Negotiation skills were number four of the 
respondents’ top 10 choices. Contemporary procurement models, including the U.S. model, 
the UK model, and the UN model, have various forms of established competitive negotiation 
procurement procedures for defense or public procurement. In contrast, the PPRA rule two-
stage bidding procedure allows for technical negotiations (PPRA Rule 36) and restricts 
financial negotiations (PPRA, 2004). According to Shah, Haq, and Shah (2008), the ban on 
negotiations in PPRA rules in 2004 has caused contractor pooling (monopolies) and an 
increase in the bid amounts. The financial clause of negotiations in the PPRA needs to be 
revised so that a “transparent and effective” negotiation process can lead to reasonable bids 
(Shah, Haq, & Shah, 2008).  
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The National Procurement Strategy (NPS) of Pakistan identified nine areas for 
improvement, one of which addresses situations for conducting financial negotiations 
(PPRA, 2013). A 2012 global survey of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
identified purchasing as one of six major fraud areas (as cited in Tan, 2013). Because 
PPRA rules do not allow for negotiations, no internal control procedures exist to guide 
the negotiating team through the financial negotiations process. According to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD), “As the amount of 
public funds being channeled into the market through public procurement procedures 
increases, the procurement process continues to be highly vulnerable to fraudulent 
activities” (as cited in Tan, 2013, p. 25). PPRA rules require a negotiations guide to 
outline the processes for financial negotiations to reduce the risk of fraud.  
This research study focuses on the creation and inclusion of financial negotiations 
procedures and related internal controls to help the Pakistan defense procurement system 
be more efficient and transparent. The U.S., UK, and UN procurement models and their 
related financial negotiations procedures, as well as the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control Framework Model 
were analyzed in order to answer the following questions:  
1. What processes should Pakistan put into place in order to perform 
defense-related financial negotiations? 
2. What internal controls would help support the financial negotiations 
process for defense contracting in Pakistan? 
D. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
The importance of this research is that PPRA rules 2004 are followed by 
government agencies for public procurement, and these rules lack a financial negotiations 
process and associated internal controls. To ensure better procurement transparency and 
obtain the best value of taxpayers’ money, conducting financial negotiations is 
imperative. This research study assesses the financial negotiations process of the 
contemporary procurement models and recommends a financial negotiations process and 
associated internal controls for PPRA rules 2004.  
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E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research study focuses on analyzing the financial negotiations process of 
contemporary procurement models and internal control policy guidelines to recommend a 
financial negotiations process for Pakistan public procurement. This research study 
identifies appropriate financial negotiations procedures for inclusion in the PPRA rules 
by the government of Pakistan for efficient and transparent utilization of taxpayer money. 
This research study also recommends a suitable internal control framework to guide the 
financial negotiations process in Pakistan and highlights in detail the financial negotiation 
procedures and related internal controls adopted by advanced acquisition models. 
This research study includes access to literature from open sources only, which 
are limited to qualitative analysis (in the case of defense-related contracts). Thus, the 
research findings are somewhat limited in context. However, these limitations have minor 
impact on the research findings. This research study is applicable to all public 
procurement in Pakistan. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This research study provides a background of the federal government’s approved 
and promulgated PPRA rules. This research study reviews and analyzes the U.S. defense 
procurement system, the UK defense procurement system, and the UNCITRAL model 
law of procurement, which the UN uses, in order to highlight the different procurement 
systems’ financial negotiations processes and make recommendations for including 
financial negotiations in Pakistan’s procurement system.  
For this research, the internationally accepted COSO Integrated Internal Control 
Framework as well as Government Accountability Office (GAO) Internal Control 
Standards are discussed and applied to types of procurement frauds within the financial 
negotiations process. Through the prism of the frameworks, the U.S., UK, and UN 
procurement systems were analyzed and relevant factors derived from the analysis were 
used to formulate policy guidelines for the financial negotiations process for Pakistan 
defense contracting.  
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G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This research study is comprised of five chapters. Chapter I introduces the 
research. Chapter II consists of a literature review of PPRA rules; an overview of the 
contract management process and elements of financial negotiation; financial 
negotiations processes of the U.S. model, UK model, and UN model; and an overview of 
the COSO Internal Control Framework. Chapter III discusses the methodology of a 
comparative analysis of the three models in relation to financial negotiation elements and 
financial negotiations processes. Chapter IV consists of an analysis of the financial 
negotiations process and related internal controls and provides recommendations. Chapter 
V provides a summary, conclusion, and areas for further research. 
H. SUMMARY 
This introductory chapter provided an overview of this research study, 
introducing the limitations on the financial negotiations processes in PPRA rules and 
defining the scope for further review of the financial negotiations process as practiced in 
contemporary procurement models. Pakistan recognizes that existing procurement laws 
and regulations are in accordance with UNCITRAL Model Law and are based on 
principles of “accountability, transparency, fairness, efficiency and value for money” 
(Public Procurement Regulatory Authority [PPRA], 2013, p. 1). The NPS of Pakistan, 
however, admits that although the first generation of procurement reforms have attained 
the basics (such as laws, regulations, and standardized documentation), “the performance 
of the public procurement system is still less than satisfactory” (PPRA, 2013, p. 5).  
The main objective of this research study is to recommend a suitable financial 
negotiations process and related internal controls to increase the efficiency and 
transparency of the Pakistan defense procurement system. The following chapter 
provides a literature review of financial negotiations processes and internal controls. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, a two-part literature review lays the foundation for a comparative 
analysis in a subsequent chapter. The first part of the literature review covers Pakistan 
Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) rules, the contract management 
process, elements of negotiations, and financial negotiations processes in the United 
States (U.S.) procurement model, the United Kingdom (UK) procurement model, and in 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) Model 
Law. The second part of this literature review covers the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control Framework, 
procurement fraud in relation to internal controls, and procurement fraud schemes. 
A. PAKISTAN’S PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT  
Pakistan’s procurement cycle is divided into five parts, unlike the U.S model, 
which covers the process in six parts. In Pakistan’s procurement system, purchasing has 
been narrowly defined as the acquisition of requirements in a limited way (Shah et al., 
2008). Shah et al. (2008) define procurement as the broader form, which encompasses the 
complete cycle of procurement management in the following six stages: 
1. Acquisition Plan 
In the acquisition planning stage, the requirement specifications, quantity, and 
delivery schedule are planned. Government organizations plan their acquisition activities 
based on quarterly released funds and/or annual budgetary allocations. A procuring 
agency is responsible for issuing the requirement specifications in approved documents 
such as the Planning Commission-1 (PC-1) form. The PC-1 form is the basic form on 
which project appraisals are made and approval is granted by the government of Pakistan 
(Sajid, 2010). The requirement specifications approved on the PC-1 are the minimum 
standards for acceptance by the acquisition team. A procuring agency must endeavor to 
procure requirements of a higher level of specifications than approved in the PC-1 form 
(Shah et al., 2008). 
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2. Contracting Plan 
During the contract planning stage of procurement management, bidding 
documents are developed and potential sellers are identified. In addition, the requirement 
is given widespread distribution and publicity to ensure maximum participation (Shah et 
al., 2008).  
3. Request Sellers’ Responses 
During the request sellers’ response stage of procurement management, bids, 
proposals, or offers are collected. This stage also involves the opening of these responses 
(bids, proposals, and offers) to tender, which is the invitation sent to potential sellers. 
This process has to be transparent to ensure maximum competition among potential 
sellers. Bids must be opened in the presence of acquisition teams and potential sellers 
who have submitted bids (Shah et al., 2008). 
4. Selection of Sellers 
During the selection of sellers’ stage of procurement management, offers are 
evaluated, the best bid is chosen, and the contract is awarded. The evaluation criteria are 
mentioned in the bidding documents, and offers are evaluated per those criteria. After the 
receipt of an offer, a change in evaluation criteria is not allowed (Shah et al., 2008). 
5. Contract Administration  
After successful completion of the contract award, the contract is executed in the 
contract administration stage. During this stage, the performance of the contractor is 
monitored and documented, and the relationship between buyer and seller is managed 
(Shah et al., 2008). 
6. Contract Closeout 
After completion of the project, a contract closeout strategy is executed. Closure 
involves completing and settling all line items of the contract and resolving all open 
disputes (Shah et al., 2008).  
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In the previous section, Pakistan’s procurement management process was 
discussed. The next section describes significant procurement rules/procedures of PPRA 
rules 2004. 
B. PPRA RULES  
In the 1990s, public procurement in Pakistan was recognized as a critical function 
after the number of procurements increased significantly as part of overall government 
expenses. There was an increased awareness that, through better controls and 
transparency, the government could ensure significant savings and better utilization of 
taxpayers’ money (PPRA, 2013). On the recommendations of a survey carried out by the 
World Bank, and after government consultation with relevant stakeholders, PPRA was 
established under PPRA Ordinance 2002 to enforce legislative and systemic procurement 
reforms in Pakistan. PPRA rules were promulgated in 2004 (PPRA, 2013). 
PPRA is an independent body. The primary role of PPRA is to submit 
recommendations to the government for new laws and regulations related to public 
procurement. PPRA also monitors the application of PPRA rules and the performance of 
federal public organizations involved in public procurement (PPRA, 2013). The 
following section discusses the important procurement rules/procedures of PPRA rules 
2004: 
1. Principles of Procurement 
Article 4 of PPRA rules provides the guiding principles for procurement. It states 
that an acquisition team should ensure the following: 
• The requirement is procured in a “fair and transparent manner.” 
• The procurement process is “efficient and economical.” 
• The procuring organization should get value for money from the 
procurement (PPRA, 2004). 
2. Pre-Qualification Procedures 
PPRA Rule 15 mandates that the procuring agency start a pre-qualification 
process before publishing the notice for invitation of tender or request for proposal 
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(RFP). Pre-qualification questionnaires (PQQs) are mandatory in the case of services, 
civil works, and technically complex requirements. The main objective of the pre-
qualification procedure is to ensure selection of technically and financially sound firms 
that have adequate managerial capacity to execute the project and its associated 
requirements. The procuring agency must take into account certain factors about the 
firm(s) for pre-qualification. These factors include past performance and experience; 
financial health; managerial capability; personnel and equipment capabilities; and any 
other factor deemed appropriate by the procuring agency (PPRA, 2004). 
3. Evaluation Criteria 
PPRA Rule 29 describes the criteria for bid evaluation. Procuring agencies are 
responsible for establishing the evaluation criteria, and the criteria are required to be 
published in bidding documents. If the procuring agency fails to publish unambiguous 
evaluation criteria, it is tantamount to “mis-procurement” (PPRA, 2004). PPRA Rule 35 
mandates the publication of an evaluation report giving justification for the 
acceptance/rejection of bids 10 days before the contract award (PPRA, 2004).  
4. Clarifications of Bids 
PPRA Rule 31 describes the communication between the acquisition team and the 
offeror. Bids cannot be altered once opened by the acquisition team. The acquisition team 
is allowed to seek clarification from the offeror; however, clarification cannot change the 
substance of the bid. Clarifications sought by the acquisition team must be made in 
writing (PPRA, 2004).  
5. Procedures for Open Competitive Bidding 
PPRA rules allow the following types of bidding procedures: 
• Single-stage, one-envelope procedure 
• Single-stage, two-envelope procedure 
• Two-stage bidding procedure  
• Two-stage, two-envelope bidding procedure (PPRA, 2004). 
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This research study focuses on the two-stage, two-envelope bidding procedure. 
The two-stage, two-envelope bidding procedure is used when more than one technical 
proposal has been received and negotiations on the technical proposals take place 
between bidders and the acquisition team (Shah et al., 2008).  
6. Two-Stage, Two-Envelope Bidding Procedure 
Two-stage bidding is adopted when the requirement is complex and proposals 
may vary technically. In this procedure, questions may be raised about the technical 
aspects of the proposals, and all offerors are provided the opportunities to understand the 
requirement and to propose better technical solutions.  
During the first stage, the technical proposal is received without the associated 
price quote. All the proposals are evaluated per the technical evaluation criteria, and 
offerors are given an opportunity to clarify the technical aspects of their proposals. After 
discussion, offerors can submit revised final proposals. The procuring agency can modify 
or delete evaluation criteria and requirement specifications before the submission of final 
proposals. Offerors not willing to change their proposals according to new specifications 
may withdraw their bids without forfeiture of their bid security, which is the amount 
deposited by the offeror before taking part in the bid. “The bid security may not exceed 
more than 5% of the bid amount” (PPRA, 2004, Rule 25). 
In the second stage, revised final proposals are received. Technical and financial 
proposals are opened simultaneously. Technical proposals are again evaluated per the 
evaluation criteria. The acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated bid is awarded the 
contract (PPRA, 2004).  
7. Limitations on Financial Negotiations 
According to Shah et al. (2008), “PPRA has banned financial negotiations 
completely with bidders as it [negotiating] may lead to personal bias, temptations, [and 
the] tendency for kickback and corruptions” (p. 382). This limitation on financial 
negotiations in PPRA rules has resulted in increased bids. According to Shah et al. 
(2008), “The PPRA needs to revise this clause of provisions, as through effective and 
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transparent negotiations process, most reasonable bid[s] can be secured” (p. 382). Now 
that the details of Pakistan’s procurement system have been discussed, the following 
section addresses the U.S. contract management process.  
C. U.S. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Generally, the contract management phases are discussed from the perspective of 
the buyer, which in this case is the government. In the U.S. procurement model, contract 
management can be divided into three phases: pre-award phase, award phase, and post-
award phase (Garrett, 2010, p. 20). The pre-award phase includes procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, and issuing the solicitation. The award phase includes the source 
selection where a contractor is selected using the award criteria, and the contract is 
signed. The post-award phase includes contract administration and contract 
closeout/termination. 
1. Procurement Planning  
Procurement planning involves recognizing which needs can best be met by 
securing items or services outside the overall mission of the organization (known as the 
make-or-buy decision) (Rendon, 2010, p. 6). Procurement planning includes the 
following activities: 
• Detailed outsource analysis; 
• Requirement definition and determination; 
• Market research and pre-solicitation conference (if required); 
• Development of cost and preliminary budget estimates; 
• Preliminary consideration for appropriate contract type selection, and 
• Risk management process (Rendon, 2010, p. 6). 
During the procurement planning phase, the stage is gradually set for the scope 
and possibility of financial negotiations. Contract negotiation begins at the first contact 
with the first communication concerning a possible opportunity between the buyer and 
the seller. At times, the first contact occurs when the buyer’s technical or operational 
representatives conduct some market research and contact their technical counterparts in 
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the respective industries (Garrett, 2005). Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Rule 
10.001(a) also mandates the conduct of market research by the procuring agency before 
establishing new requirement documents (FAR, 2015).  
2. Solicitation Planning  
Solicitation planning involves preparation of solicitation-related documents 
required for the solicitation phase. This phase involves the identification of potential 
sellers and documentation of procurement requirements. Solicitation planning includes 
the following activities: 
• Finalizing the procurement method 
• Finalizing the contract type (cost versus fixed price); 
• Maturing solicitation documents: RFPs, requests for quotations (RFQ), 
and invitation for bids (IFB) 
• Finalizing contract award strategy and proposal evaluation criteria 
• Developing the terms and conditions of the contract; and 
• Determining solicitation service or product descriptions, the statement of 
work (SOW), and the work breakdown structure (WBS, Rendon, 2010, p. 
7) 
The procurement method is determined in this phase of the contract management 
process. The procurement method determines whether the award will be made through 
sealed bids or negotiated proposals. Sealed bidding is used for non-complex requirements 
where technical acceptability is easily defined and price is the most important factor. 
Sealed bidding uses the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection 
method. Negotiations typically take place when technical acceptability is not as easily 
defined, and when the buyer may want to choose an offer that is not the lowest priced or 
that is not rated the highest technically. Negotiated procurements typically use the 
tradeoff source selection method. Both source selection methods are described in more 
detail next.  
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a. Source Selection Method Selection: The Best Value Continuum 
The aim of the U.S. government is always to obtain the best value for the 
taxpayers’ dollars. FAR 15.101 describes how the best value can be obtained for different 
types of acquisitions by applying different source selection approaches. 
(1) LPTA 
On one end of the best value continuum is the LPTA source selection method. A 
buyer typically choses this method when the requirement is well defined, performance 
risk is low, and price is the most important factor. Technical acceptability is evaluated on 
a pass/fail or acceptable/unacceptable basis, and the offer with the lowest price and an 
acceptable technical rating is awarded the contract. While negotiations are permitted in 
LPTA acquisitions, they are not typically needed (FAR, 2015). 
(2) Tradeoff Process  
On the other end of the continuum is the tradeoff source selection method. A 
buyer typically chooses this method when the requirement is not as clearly defined, 
performance risk is higher, and “it may be in the best interest of the Government to 
consider award[ing] to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than the highest 
technically rated offer” (FAR 15.101-1). In this process, the evaluation criteria and any 
relevant subfactors are defined in the solicitation. Further, the relative importance of each 
factor and subfactor is stated in the solicitation, and the proposals are evaluated against 
the defined importance of the factors. The buyer may trade price for non-price factors, 
but the perceived benefits of accepting a higher-price proposal must be clearly stated in 
the source selection documentation. Because the tradeoff process deals with less-defined, 
higher risk acquisitions, negotiations are typically used to ensure the government 
achieves best value (FAR 15.101).   
3. Solicitation  
The solicitation phase involves “obtaining information (bids and proposals) from 
prospective sellers on how the requirement can be met” (Garrett, 2010, p. 90). The 
solicitation phase includes the following activities: 
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• Advertising the requirement publically; 
• Conducting bidders’ conference, if required; and 
• Maintaining a qualified bidders’ list (Rendon, 2010, p. 7). 
From the contract negotiations prospective, bidders’ conferences are important 
events. The meetings (also known as vendor, contractor, or pre-bid conferences) are 
conferences with sellers before the finalization of the proposals. These meetings ensure 
all the sellers have the same level of understanding and understand the requirement 
correctly. This ensures better quality proposals and maximizes competition by increasing 
the number of proposals in the competitive range. Responses to the sellers’ queries are 
included in the procurement documents as amendments (Garrett, 2010, p. 91). 
4. Source Selection  
Source selection involves the receipt of the contractor proposals and assessment 
of the proposals in light of the evaluation criteria. This process may also include contract 
negotiations with the seller(s) on technical, cost, performance, and schedule-related 
matters. This process includes the following activities: 
• Applying the contract award/evaluation criteria to the cost and technical 
proposal(s); 
• Negotiating with prospective sellers; and 
• Executing the contract award strategy (Rendon, 2010, p. 7). 
Five processes form the core of the source selection phase. The source selection 
process commences with proposal evaluations, which are carried out in two parts—initial 
and final evaluations (Cole, 2001, p. 2). The initial evaluation commences after the 
receipt of the proposals. All proposals are subject to an initial evaluation, which applies 
the evaluation factors contained in the RFP. The process of initial evaluation culminates 
with the establishment of the competitive range. The competitive range “comprises all of 
the highly rated proposals” (FAR 15.306(c)). The contracting officer can limit the 
number of proposals included in the competitive range for efficient competition (FAR 
15.306).  
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The financial negotiations are conducted with only those sellers whose proposals 
fall within the competitive range. A round or round(s) of negotiations are held with the 
sellers. The acquisition team may reduce the number of sellers in subsequent rounds of 
negotiations. According to Cole (2001), the purpose of negotiations is to “advise the 
offerors of any problems (deficiencies, weaknesses, excesses, etc.) with their proposals 
and afford them an opportunity to revise their proposal and improve their chances of the 
award” (p. 3). After completion of a round or rounds of negotiations, sellers are afforded 
an opportunity to submit their final proposals by a set date. Resubmission of proposals 
generally marks the culmination of the negotiation process. Final evaluation starts after 
the culmination of negotiations and upon receipt of the final proposal revisions. Final 
evaluation is based on the evaluation factors appended in the solicitation and applied to 
the seller’s basic proposal as revised in its final version (Cole, 2001, p. 2). Final 
evaluations are carried out by all or some of the same evaluators who were part of the 
initial evaluation team. The final evaluation process formally ends when the award 
recommendations and final evaluations are submitted to the competent authority. 
5. Contract Administration  
The contract administration process ensures that contractual obligations/ 
requirements are fulfilled and the performance of all parties is per the contract (Garrett, 
2010, p. 162). The contract administration process will depend on the contract 
performance duration, type of contract, and so forth. The contract administration phase 
includes the following activities: 
• Pre-performance conference (if required) 
• Performance measurement system 
• Change control system 
• Contract monitoring (Rendon, 2010, p. 8) 
Generally, “government contracts contain a changes clause that permits unilateral 
changes by the government, within the general scope of the contract” (FAR 43.201). 
These changes may pertain to schedule, requirements, and so forth. The government 
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negotiates the equitable adjustments arising from change orders with the sellers. 
However, such negotiations are not included in the scope of this research study.  
6. Contract Closeout and Termination   
Contract closeout and termination involves verifying that all regulatory matters 
are completed on a contract that has met all performance requirements. Contract closeout 
of a government contract can result from three possible scenarios: (a) successful 
completion of the contract’s performance requirement; (b) termination for convenience, 
where the buyer terminates the contract without penalty to the seller, and (c) termination 
for default, where the contract is terminated due to the seller’s failure to perform to the 
standards set in the contract. Regardless of the scenario, the contract closeout process has 
to be performed. This process includes the following activities: 
• Product delivery or service completion; 
• Acceptance and final payment; and 
• Documentation of final contractor past performance report (Rendon, 2010, 
p. 9). 
Figure 1 summarizes the contract management process and phases in relation to 
financial negotiations based on the U.S. model. 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Contract Management Process 
 
The following section discusses the elements of financial negotiations.  
D. ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Defense system acquisition is normally done in a fiscal resource-constrained 
environment. Acquisition teams are always under pressure from legislative and 
government oversight bodies to ensure the best value for taxpayer money, and 
negotiations help reach that goal. Government acquisition teams constantly engage 
industry to ensure the best utilization of taxpayer money. These exchanges allow the 
teams to better understand each other’s point of view. The U.S. Air Force Negotiation 
Center (AFNC) loosely defines negotiation as “a deliberate process where two or more 
people or groups work to solve a difference or problem” (AFNC, 2016). Financial 
negotiations are important tools to achieving the goal of getting the best value of taxpayer 
money. The U.S. GAO conducted a survey of 25 one-offer (i.e., single-offer) awards 
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from 2011 to 2012 and found that government negotiators managed a 1.4% decrease in 
contractors’ profit rate after negotiating with contractors (GAO, 2013, p. 24).  
Most people think of negotiations as occurring only during the source selection 
phase. However, the fundamental elements of the negotiation process are spread over the 
pre-award and award phases of the contract management process (see Figure 1). Basic 
elements that contribute toward successful negotiations are (a) market research, (b) 
maximizing competition, (c) appropriate contract type, (d) best value continuum, (e) cost 
and pricing data, and (f) negotiation exchanges (Office of the Secretary Defense [OSD], 
2010). Each of these elements are described in detail in the following sections. 
1. Market Research 
Market research is initially conducted during the procurement planning phase of 
the contract management process, typically by the requirement initiator. Government 
negotiation teams normally have access to initial cost estimates provided by sponsor 
program offices. However, using market research helps government negotiators develop a 
better understanding of the requirement, related market conditions, offeror’s price, cost 
estimation processes, and so forth. Market research can produce the following important 
pieces of information: 
• Historical pricing data (information pertaining to past prices and trends); 
• Current competitive conditions (number of buyers and sellers in market); 
• Impact of current demand (market reaction to current quantity of demand); 
• Trends/patterns of supply and demand; 
• Pricing strategies of offerors; 
• Sources of supplies/services; 
• Delivery/performance terms (commercial lead times and transportation 
costs, if any); and 
• Problems such as claims or cost overruns on similar products in the past 
(OSD, 2010, p. 32). 
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Information obtained through market research must be recorded. The quality of 
information obtained through market research determines the confidence level of 
negotiators on price estimates and other vital information for the negotiation process. 
2. Maximizing Competition 
Maximizing competition is an important tool in the acquisition process that 
encourages market players (firms) to offer better quality products or services at 
competitive rates. “Competition means maximizing price competition” (OSD, 2010, p. 
56), Competition is universally known to lower prices while simultaneously increasing 
the quality of products and services. Acquisition teams must do the following to 
maximize competition: 
• Attract competitive offers from suitable sellers. 
• Obtain reasonably priced proposals (OSD, 2010, p. 56). 
Having a competitive environment during the solicitation and source selection 
process facilitates successful financial negotiations. Armed with the competing offers of 
high quality products and services, financial negotiators are in a better bargaining 
position to obtain the best value with the constrained financial resources.  
Financial negotiations in the sole source environment are a completely different 
domain than financial negotiations in the competitive environment. Sole source 
negotiations are protected by legislation that (under certain conditions) requires sellers to 
submit certified cost and pricing data for evaluation. Negotiators evaluate the data to 
ensure allowability of costs and to negotiate the profit margin. Cost and pricing data are 
discussed in detail later in this section. 
3. Appropriate Contract Type 
Choosing a contract type that is commensurate with the level of risk is an 
important factor in shaping the financial negotiations process. Risk factors associated 
with the requirement are considered in the selection of contract type. Specifically, risk 
varies with product type and technology maturation status of the product currently 
prevalent in the market. The two main contract types are fixed-price and cost-type. In 
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fixed-price contracts, all the risk is borne by the contractor. Fixed-price contracts are 
typically used when the following conditions are met: 
• The requirement is sufficiently defined. 
• Contractors are well experienced in meeting the requirement. 
• Stable market conditions exist. 
• Insignificant financial risks are involved (OSD, 2010, p. 64). 
On the other hand, in cost-type contracts, most of the risk is borne by the 
government. According to the Contract Pricing Reference Guide (CPRG), Volume I, a 
cost-type contract “is used only when formulas relating fee to performance would be 
unworkable or of marginal utility” (OSD, 2010, p. 66).  
Selection of contract type has an impact on the negotiations process. If a fixed-
price contract is selected when the technology is not mature, the requirement is not well 
defined, and the risk mitigation is beyond the control of the contractor, the price of the 
contract will increase, and competition will decrease. This situation will have a negative 
impact on the negotiations process for the government, placing it in a position of low 
power in relation to the contractor. On the other hand, if a cost-type contract is selected 
when the requirement is well defined and risk factors can easily be mitigated by the 
seller, the seller will not have enough motivation to reduce costs, as the government will 
be bound to reimburse all reasonable, allocable, and allowable costs. Appropriate use of 
contract type creates a favorable environment for subsequent negotiations.  
4. Best Value Continuum  
The best value and tradeoff process (best value continuum) includes procurement 
of products and services through a competitive, negotiated procedure in which the 
government reserves the right to buy products and services from the most economically 
advantageous seller by considering factors other than cost/price (Defense Acquisition 
University [DAU], 2016). The best value continuum has been previously discussed in 
detail in the U.S. contract management process section of this research study.  
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5. Cost and Pricing Data  
In government procurements, cost and pricing data may form the basis of analysis 
for financial negotiations. Cost and pricing data may include previous government 
acquisition data, historical price data, market data, proposals submitted by sellers, and 
certified cost and pricing data obtained from the bidders. The FAR states that cost and 
pricing data may include the following factors: vendor quotations, non-recurring costs, 
make-or-buy decisions, management decisions having significant bearing on cost, 
resources vis-à-vis business goals, labor efficiency unit cost, operations costs, and 
projection of business objectives and costs (FAR 2.101). 
Initial evaluation of the cost and pricing data helps to set a competitive range. 
This range helps the procurement team negotiate only with the shortlist of sellers. 
Independent cost estimates also help set the competitive range. Once the competitive 
range is established and the shortlist is created, invitations to negotiate are extended to 
sellers in the competitive range.  
6. Negotiation Exchanges 
After completion of the evaluation processes, the acquisition team carries out 
various rounds of negotiations with the sellers in the competitive range (FAR 15.306(c)). 
The number of rounds may vary according to the nature of the requirement and the 
completeness of proposals (Defense Equipment and Support [DE&S] & Ministry of 
Defence [MoD], 2014). The acquisition team may reduce the number of participants in 
the succeeding rounds by reducing the competitive range (DE&S & MoD, 2014). 
Generally, there is no limit on the number of negotiation rounds. Negotiations are 
formally completed upon submission of final and revised offers from the potential sellers.   
In the previous sections, Pakistan’s procurement system, the U.S. contract 
management process, and elements of financial negotiations have been discussed. The 
following descriptions of the U.S., the UK, and the UN procurement models are analyzed 
and compared later in this research study in order to make recommendations for 
Pakistan’s procurement system.  
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E. U.S. PROCUREMENT MODEL 
The president of the United States is the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed 
Forces and presents the proposed budget for the U.S. Armed Forces to Congress. 
Congress has the authority to approve and provide oversight of spending, as the power of 
the purse resides with Congress (Stith, 1998). Congress has established a two-step 
approval procedure: The first step includes the authorization, and the second step 
involves appropriations (Kausal, Humily, Taylor, & Roller, 1999, p. 4–11). Within 
Congress, the committees with the most influence over Department of Defense (DOD) 
budgets are the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and the Senate and 
House Appropriations Committees (Kausal et al., 1999, p. 4–5).  
Figure 2 displays the graphical representation of the U.S. acquisition system and 
overlapping three support systems.  
 
Figure 2.  The U.S. Acquisition System. Source: Schwartz (2014). 
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1. DOD Acquisition Cycle  
Title 10 of the U.S. Code is the statutory authority that governs the United States 
Armed Forces organization, operations, and structure. Secretaries of the respective 
services draw authority to equip the services from Title 10 (Schwartz, 2014). Provisions 
affecting Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) fall under Title 10. Title 10 also 
covers the establishment of acquisition procedures and reporting requirements to 
Congress. Title 10 is also the source for the National Defense Authorization Act through 
which Congress modifies the defense acquisition structure.   
DOD acquisition activities are generally governed by the FAR, Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and a third set of service-specific 
regulations (e.g., the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, or 
AFFARS). Kausal et al. (1999) define the DOD’s acquisition as “the conceptualization, 
initiation, design, development, test, contracting, production, deployment, and logistic 
support, modification, and disposal of weapons and other systems, supplies, or services 
(including construction) to satisfy defense needs, intended for use in or in support of 
military missions” (p. 4–70). 
The DOD acquisition system comprises three decision support systems, 
commonly referred to as the “Big A” of acquisition (see Figure 2).  
• The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). 
JCIDS is the DOD requirement generation system (CJCSI 3170.01I, 
2015). 
• The Budgeting Process: Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution System (PPBE). PPBE is the financial/budgetary overlay for 
the acquisition programs, including MDAPs. 
• The Defense Acquisition System. The defense acquisition system— also 
known as the “little a” of the acquisition system—is governed by the DOD 
5000 series and Defense Acquisition Handbook. It is the process through 
which the DOD procures and develops weapon systems for U.S. Armed 
Forces (Schwartz, 2014). The Defense Acquisition System uses the 
milestone concept for program management (see Figure 3). Milestones act 
as benchmarks, with specific entry and exit criteria that have to be fulfilled 
before entry to the next phase. Milestone A is the culmination of the 
Material Solution Analysis and entry into the Technology Maturation and 
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Risk Reduction phase. Milestone B is the culmination of the Technology 
Maturation and Risk Reduction phase and entry into Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase. Milestone C initiates the Production 
and Deployment phase of the weapons system development process 
(Schwartz, 2014, pp. 6–12). 
  
Figure 3.  Defense Acquisition System. Source: Schwartz (2014). 
 
2. Negotiated Procurement 
The FAR defines negotiations as “exchanges, in either a competitive or sole 
source environment, between the Government and offerors that are undertaken with the 
intent of allowing the offeror to revise its proposal” (FAR 15.306). Negotiated 
procurements are those that intend to use exchanges with sellers to reduce the risk of the 
acquisition.  
3. Types of Negotiated Procurement  
FAR 15.022 discusses two types of negotiated procurements: (a) sole source 
acquisitions, in which the RFP is sanitized of any unnecessary information like proposal 
preparation instructions and evaluation criteria, and (b) competitive negotiated 
acquisitions, which follow a streamlined process to reduce the complexities of the 
solicitation and source selection process. FAR Part 15 describes the procedure in detail. 
Competitive negotiations procedures are described in the next section.  
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4. Competitive Negotiations in the Solicitation Process  
FAR 15.203 states that for the competitive negotiation process, an RFP is 
required. RFPs are employed to solicit proposals and communicate the government’s 
requirement to prospective sellers. FAR 15.202 gives the option of a multistep process. 
Before floating the RFP, the government can issue a pre-solicitation notice that gives the 
description of the requirement and asks potential sellers to submit information regarding 
their viability as potential offerors. The pre-solicitation notice also lays down the initial 
evaluation criteria that will be used by the government. The RFP content includes the 
description of the requirement, contract terms and conditions (sellers may propose 
alternate term and conditions), information to be included in the potential sellers’ 
proposals, and proposal evaluation criteria. The acquisition team has the liberty to 
communicate with the potential sellers before the receipt of their proposals. FAR 15.201 
allows exchanges of information through the start of the requirement formulation process 
to receipt of proposals process. The purpose of exchanges is twofold: to give the 
acquisition team insight into industry capabilities and to help industry understand the 
requirement. Exchange forums and techniques include industry conferences, market 
research, pre-solicitation notices, requests for information (RFIs), and so forth (FAR, 
2015).  
5. Source Selection  
Source selection is the responsibility of the head of the acquisition agency (FAR 
15.303(a)). Normally, contracting officers act as the source selection authority unless 
specified by the agency head (FAR 15.303(a)). It is the responsibility of the source 
selection authority to select a team with the appropriate specialties tailored according to 
the requirement and to evaluate the proposals and select the best offer. In the U.S. 
system, the main source selection methods are LPTA and tradeoff, both on the best value 
continuum as previously described. Award recommendations are based on the evaluation 
factors and sub factors specified in the solicitations (FAR 15.304). Evaluation factors 
must reflect the specific, important areas of the requirement, with emphasis on the factors 
that help the government distinguish among competing proposals (FAR, 2015). Title 10 
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U.S.C. 2305(a)(3)(A) (ii) and 41 U.S.C. 3306(c)(1)(B)) make evaluation of price or cost 
factors mandatory for all government contracts (FAR, 2015). Proposal evaluation and 
exchange with offerors are discussed next.  
a. Proposal Evaluation  
FAR 15.305 explains the proposal evaluation procedure to assess the sellers’ 
ability to perform the contract successfully. Factors advertised in the solicitation are the 
sole criteria for proposal assessment. Cost/price and quality (typically in the form of a 
technical evaluation) are required evaluation factors for negotiated procurements, and 
past performance is required for negotiated procurements above the simplified acquisition 
threshold (currently at $150,000, DAU, 2015). The proposal evaluation records 
significant weaknesses, risks, relative strengths, and deficiencies in the proposal.  
(1) Cost or Price Evaluation 
The FAR 15.305 identifies competition as the best criteria to judge the price 
factor. Price comparison of proposals submitted by the various sellers can satisfy the 
price analysis requirement, and cost analysis may not be required. “Price means cost plus 
any fee or profit applicable to the contract type” (FAR, 15.401). However, under certain 
conditions, cost analysis may be necessary to establish the price reasonableness of the 
proposal (FAR, 2015). For cost-type contracts, cost realism analysis is included in the 
evaluation criteria. This analysis determines sellers’ ability to perform contract 
requirements within the stated costs (FAR, 2015). “Cost realism analysis may also be 
used on competitive fixed-price incentive contracts” (FAR 15.404-1(d)(3)).  
(2) Past Performance Evaluation 
Evaluation of contractors’ past performance is another criterion to assess potential 
sellers’ ability to fulfill contractual obligations. Solicitation documents clearly mention 
the need to evaluate past performance (FAR, 2015). FAR makes it clear that evaluation of 
past performance and responsibility determination are two separate issues. Responsibility 
determination is covered under FAR 9.1. FAR states that “in case of an offeror without a 
record of relevant past performance or from whom information on past performance is 
 28 
not available, the offeror may not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably on past 
performance.” (FAR 15.305(a)(2)(iv)).  
(3) Technical Evaluation 
Technical factors are required for both LPTA and tradeoff acquisitions. The 
government assesses the quality of the product, very often by using technical criteria. In 
case of the LPTA acquisitions, technical evaluation results in the acceptance or rejection 
of the product. When tradeoffs are performed, the acquisition teams carries out an 
assessment of sellers’ ability to accomplish the technical requirements (FAR 15.305). 
The technical evaluation process should record a quantitative ranking or matrix for each 
technical proposal (FAR 15.305).  
b. Exchanges with Offerors 
FAR 15.306 addresses exchanges with the offerors after receipt of proposals, 
which in essence forms the negotiation exchanges (FAR, 2015).  
(1) Clarifications without Discussion and Award 
FAR defines clarifications as “limited exchanges” between the potential seller 
and government when award without discussion is being considered. Clarifications are an 
opportunity provided to the offeror to explain his or her position on different aspects of 
the proposal, including past performance information (FAR 15.306). Clarifications are 
purposefully limited as they are not part of the negotiation process. They are meant to 
clear up minor discrepancies or clarify minor misunderstandings. They are not an avenue 
to modify a proposal substantively. 
(2) Communication before Establishment of Competitive Range 
The FAR defines communication as the exchanges between the potential seller 
and the government that occur before the establishment of the competitive range. These 
communications may be used to enhance understanding of the proposal, address 
ambiguities in the offeror’s proposal, provide information regarding offeror’s past 
performance, and facilitate the evaluation process (FAR, 2015). 
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(3) Exchanges after Establishment of Competitive Range 
The FAR defines exchanges as the negotiations between the seller and the 
government (FAR, 2015). The FAR states that the process includes “bargaining, 
persuasion, alteration of assumptions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to 
price, schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other terms of a proposed 
contract” (FAR 15.306(d)). Negotiations conducted after the formulation of the 
competitive range are termed discussions. The main objective of the government for 
conducting discussions is to achieve best value. Contracting officers can discuss different 
parts of a proposal that can be amended to enhance the proposal’s chance for award 
(FAR, 2015).  
F. EU (UK) DEFENSE PROCUREMENT MODEL 
European Union (EU) Public Contract Regulations 2015 established the rules for 
public procurement in EU member states. However, defense and security equipment is 
procured under the EU Defense and Security Procurement Directive. The directive also 
acts as a framework to remove barriers in cross-border trade for defense and security 
equipment within the EU (Edwards, 2011). This directive is applicable to the 
procurements made by the member state authorities that exceed financial thresholds set 
under the EU Defense and Security Procurement Directive. The EU Defense and Security 
Procurement Directive has been implemented in the form of regulations by respective 
member countries.  
1. The Defense and Security Public Contract Regulations 2011 Scope 
Rule 8 of Defense and Security Public Contract Regulations (DSPCR) Guidance 
Chapter 1 describes the scope of the DSPCR (DE&S & MoD, 2014). DSPCR Guidance 
Chapter 1 Rule 8 states that DSPCR is applicable for the procurement of “military and 
sensitive security equipment including parts, components, assemblies, and 
subassemblies” (DE&S & MoD, 2014, p. 2). DSPCR Guidance Chapter 2, Rule 7 states 
that DSPCR also applies to the “work, goods, and services related to military and 
sensitive security equipment” throughout the life cycle of the equipment (DE&S & MoD, 
2014, p. 2). DSPCR Guidance Chapter 1, Rule 11 clarifies that procurement of 
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nonmilitary, nonsensitive, and civil equipment, works, and goods are covered by the 
Public Contract Regulation (PCR) 2015 (DE&S & MoD, 2014). 
DSPCR Guidance Chapter 2 Regulation 8 defines the types of military equipment 
that can be procured. Military equipment is defined as “equipment specifically designed 
or adapted for military purposes and intended for use as arms, munitions, or war 
material” (DE&S & MoD, 2014, p. 2). However, DSPCR does not provide a strict 
interpretation of the definition of military equipment. DSPCR also applies to the 
procurement of equipment not specifically designed for the armed forces but adapted to 
serve a military purpose. DSPCR Guidance Chapter 2 states that dual use of equipment 
meant for civil use without adaptation is unlikely to be covered under its umbrella 
(DE&S & MoD, 2014).  
DSPCR Chapter 2, Rules 15–19 define the types of sensitive security equipment 
that can be procured. DSPCR Chapter 2, Rules 16 state that security equipment procured 
through DSPCR must be used for security purposes and “does not have to be specifically 
designed or adapted for security purposes” (DE&S & MoD, 2014, p. 3). Security 
purposes may involve counterterrorism, communication and postal networks, border 
protection, energy and natural resources, crisis management missions, and so forth 
(DE&S and MoD, 2014). 
PCR 2006 (now PCR 2015) covers the procurement of nonmilitary and security-
related equipment for military and security institutions like the MoD (Wood & 
Wolfenden, 2011). 
 DSPCR Guidance Chapter 1, Rule 9 provides the monetary threshold for 
procurements with values exceeding or equal to (excluding value added tax)  
• 345,028 (UK pounds) for goods and services 
• 4,322,012 (UK pounds) for works (DE&S and MoD, 2014) 
2. Statutory Requirement of Defense Procurements in the UK 
The UK has established DSPCR 2011 to implement the EU Defense and Security 
Procurement Directive. Each EU member state has developed national procedures for 
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procurement of defense and security equipment, which vary in terms of publications, and 
tendering procedures. This research study uses the UK DSPCR to explain the process of 
the EU defense model.  
3. UK Defense Acquisition System  
The UK MoD Acquisition System Handbook defines an acquisition system (see 
Figure 4) as a “set of discrete roles, accountabilities, functions and activities undertaken 
by key individuals to deliver the equipment, services, logistics and support (ESL&S) 
required principally by the armed forces—including procurement, in-service support and 
commodity management” (UK MoD, 2014, p. 6). 
Figure 4.  UK Defense Acquisition System. Source: Acquisition System 
Handbook UK MoD (2014) 
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The acquisition system is based on two principles: 
• Simplicity of approach—using a simple and efficient process eliminating 
the complexity wherever possible 
• Clarity of accountability—responsibilities and accountability on an 
individual basis are made clear through appropriate mechanisms built into 
the system (UK MoD, 2014, p. 6) 
The DE&S Agency is assigned the responsibility of procuring military equipment 
and support services for UK Armed Forces. It is also responsible for providing support to 
operationally deployed forces. 
4. Acquisition Cycle 
The objective of the UK acquisition cycle (see Figure 5) is to reduce risk 
associated with the program before the “main gate” so that the project is mature before 
entering the demonstration phase and the targets set for the cost, performance, and 
schedule are met (UK MoD, 2002). The hallmark of the acquisition cycle is the integrated 
project teams (IPTs), which ensure a continuous flow of responsibility throughout the 
acquisition cycle. Acquisition is a continuous process during which the six stages involve 
implementing the decisions agreed upon in the previous stage, analyzing the results, and 
planning for the next stage (Taylor, 2003).  
Figure 5.  The New Acquisition Cycle. Source: Taylor (2003). 
 
The main objective of the concept stage is to select options to satisfy the 
requirement. IPTs are formed at this stage and identify and produce a baseline statement 
of the outputs required by the user. The document providing the baseline outputs is 
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known as the user requirement document (URD). Through the initial involvement of the 
industry, technologies and products are identified that can fulfill the outputs spelled out in 
the URD. At the initial gate, the feasibility of the program is assessed, and the resources 
required for the program are approved (Taylor, 2003).  
During the assessment stage, the system requirement document (SRD) is 
produced by trading time, cost, and performance parameters while remaining within the 
boundaries approved during the initial gate review (UK MoD, 2002). The SRD is the 
equivalent of the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction phase in the United States. 
The main decision point of the phase is the main gate review. In this review, the IPT and 
the customer jointly provide recommendations to the approving authority on whether the 
program should enter the demonstration stage (Taylor, 2003). Projects not demonstrating 
acceptable cost, performance, and schedule parameters are recommended to be shelved 
(Taylor, 2003). 
In the demonstration stage, the ability to produce integrated solutions is 
demonstrated. Developmental risk is methodically reduced, and linkage between the 
selected technological solution, SRD, and URD is ensured (Taylor, 2003). In the 
manufacturing stage, the production of the equipment takes place within cost, 
performance, and schedule parameters. System acceptance is validated in this stage to 
ensure conformity to the SRD and URD (Taylor, 2003).  
In the “in-service” stage, the capability of the system is available for operational 
use and is gauged as per the SRD and UDR defined parameters. Support for the in-use 
system takes place, as well as agreed upon upgrades, and acquisition increments are 
ensured in this stage (Taylor, 2003). Finally, equipment disposal ensures safe and 
efficient disposal of end-of-life and obsolete systems (Taylor, 2003). 
5. DSPCR—Formulation of Technical Specifications 
DSPCR Guidance Chapter 7, Rule 7 explains that the objective of the technical 
specification is to provide equal opportunity to all suppliers (including EU suppliers) by 
ensuring that particular products of domestic suppliers are not being favored and to avoid 
any unjustified obstacles in holding a free and fair solicitations process for other EU 
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member states’ suppliers (DE&S & MoD, 2014). Technical specifications are attached to 
the contract notice (DE&S & MoD, 2014). DSPCR Guidance Chapter 7, Rules 12–17 
mention two mandatory technical requirements that must be included in the specification 
of the goods, work, or services being solicited. The first part pertains to the requirements 
imposed by the national laws (specific to the countries in the case of EU), such as 
ingredients of a product which are harmful for public health and safety. The second part 
is the technical requirement imposed by the treaties between EU member countries and 
by international agreements (DE&S & MoD, 2014). The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) standardization agreements (STANAGs) are examples of military 
standards accepted by the UK and other EU member countries (DE&S & MoD, 2014). 
Technical specification assumes added importance in the negotiated procedure as the 
firms have leverage in negotiations with better technical specifications of their products.  
6. Award Criteria for Contract  
DSPCR Regulation 31 lays the foundation for the award criteria. DSPCR Regulation 
31(1) states that a contract may be awarded based on lowest price tender or most 
economically advantageous tender (MEAT) from the point of view of the procurer (DSPCR, 
2011). Lowest price means the proposal is technically acceptable and fully compliant to the 
commercially acceptable standards. MEAT means the tender is assessed based on objective 
criteria to ensure best value of money. DSPCR Regulation 31(2) lays out detailed examples 
of the criteria for offer/tender assessment. Criteria include technical merit, life cycle costs, 
interoperability and operational characteristics, after-sales service and technical assistance, 
quality, price, security of supply, and so forth (DSPCR, 2011).  
The document entitled “Managing Public Money” (MPM) sets out the UK’s 
procurement policy to buy goods and services through fair and open procurement 
processes to get best value (2015). Value for money remains the main concept of MPM. 
Value for money means, “securing the best mix of effectiveness, efficiency and economy 
in the use of resources. . The primary objective of procurers is to choose the compliant 
tender offering the best Value For Money solution” (Government of UK, 2015, Annex 
4.6). 
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7. Weightage of Award Criteria—Price Factor 
The UK MoD has given guidance (see Figure 6) in the form of a decision chart 
depicting the split between the pricing and other criteria. Price factor weightage ranges 
between 0% and 39%, depending on the requirement. When sufficient technical solutions 
are available in the market, the highest weightage for price factors is given in the award 
criteria (DE&S & MoD, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 6.  Guide to Deciding the Split between Price and Other Factors. 
Source: DE&S & MoD (2015). 
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8. Types of Procurement Procedures 
DSPCR Chapter 8, Rule 3 explains the procurement procedures (processes) that 
public institutions (military and security) should follow while contracting for goods, 
works, and services. The procedures are as follows: 
• Restricted procedure 
• Competitive negotiated procedure 
• Competitive dialogue procedure 
• Noncompetitive negotiated procedure (DE&S & MoD, 2014) 
This research focuses on the competitive negotiated procedure and the 
competitive dialogue procedure. 
a. Competitive Negotiated Procedure  
DSPCR Regulation 18 covers the competitive negotiated procedure (see Figure 
7). This procedure requires a prior publication of contract notice, with the possibility of 
negotiation and iterative bidding included in the notice. Before the receipt of the requests, 
a bidders’ conference may be held to provide the potential suppliers an opportunity to 
examine the requirements in detail and the acquisition team to witness demonstrations 
and visit the tenderers’ facilities (UK MoD, 2015). After the receipt of requests from 
tenderers, the suppliers are shortlisted. Shortlisting is done before issuing an invitation to 
negotiate based on responses to a PQQ by the tenderers. DSPCR Guidance Chapter 14 
provides detailed instructions on the formulation of the PQQ and its use for shortlisting. 
The PQQ, in accordance with Rule 23 of DSPCR, asks for the eligibility of the suppliers. 
The PQQ also “assess[es] against the minimum standards of economic and financial 
standing, and technical and professional capability” (DE&S & MoD, 2014, p. 9). These 
standards must be published in the contract notice. To ensure transparency and 
competition, procurers should invite at least three tenderers for negotiation. Tender 
evaluation should be done in accordance with the articles of transparency, equal 
treatment, and non-discrimination of the Treaty on Functioning of European Union 
(TFEU, UK MoD, 2015). A tender evaluation board composed of technical, financial, 
commercial, and subject matter experts carries out the tender evaluation. DSPCR 
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Guidance Chapter 8, Rule 37 allows iterative tendering in competitive negotiated 
procedures (DE&S & MoD, 2014). DSPCR Guidance Chapter 15, Rule 88 states the aim 
of the competitive negotiated procedure “is to improve in value of money terms” (DE&S 
& MoD, 2014). DSPCR Guidance Chapter 15, Rules 87–92 describe that under the 
competitive negotiated procedure, negotiations are carried out in successive stages. 
Tenderers are reduced in the successive stages by applying the contract award criteria. In 
the advanced stages of the negotiation process, tenderers may be asked to submit a 
revised or confirm offer (ROCO). ROCO invitations are sent when the number of 
unresolved issues is high. ROCOs can be tailored according to issues specific to each 
tenderer. Tenderers can also be asked to submit best and final offer (BAFO). The aim of 
ROCOs and BAFOs is to get best value for money. A BAFO is obtained through 
“another round of tendering where the evaluation cannot clearly identify the tenderer to 
award the contract” (DE&S & MoD, 2014, p. 5).  
 
Figure 7.  UK MoD Competitive Negotiated Procedure Overview. 
Source: DE&S & MoD (2014). 
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After BAFOs are received, the contract negotiations are culminated and the 
contract is awarded. An award decision notice is used to inform tenderers about the 
contract award decision (DE&S & MoD, 2014). 
b. Competitive Dialogue Procedure 
DSPCR Regulation 19 covers the competitive dialogue procedure (see Figure 8). 
DSPCR Guidance Chapter 8, Rule 9 states that competitive dialogue may be used for 
more complex contracts that may not be adequately pursued using the restricted or 
competitive negotiated procedure (DE&S & MoD, 2014). A structured dialogue to 
negotiate with bidders after the invitation to participate in dialogue (ITPD) is considered 
a competitive dialogue (DE&S & MoD, 2014).  
Figure 8.  UK MoD Competitive Dialogue Procedure. 
Source: DE&S & MoD (2014). 
 
The competitive dialogue process starts with the issuance of a contract notice. The 
contract notice for the competitive dialogue should specify the requirement, minimum 
number of candidates, objective and non-discriminatory criteria, intent to conduct 
negotiation in stages or not, permission for variant bids, and procedural time limits for 
receipt of requests (DE&S & MoD, 2014). A minimum of three candidates are required 
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to be issued ITPDs, provided they meet the minimum criteria. For more complex 
requirements, the bidders may form a consortium. However, making a consortium does 
not automatically confer qualifying status to the parties (DE&S & MoD, 2014).  
The competitive dialogue process is usually a mix of negotiation and tendering at 
a meeting. Competitive dialogue can be carried out with individual candidates. Dialogue 
commences after the ITPD is issued. DSPCR does limit the number of dialogue rounds 
that can be conducted. DSPCR Guidance Chapter 8, Rule 15 states that ITPDs should 
include the following details: 
• Contract details for acquisition team 
• Modus operandi of dialogue—date, time and rendezvous for all rounds of 
dialogue 
• Project program with sufficient cushion built in to allow for unforeseen 
requirements (DE&S & MoD, 2014) 
DSPCR Regulation 19(29) states that an award should be made on the basis of the 
MEAT. The criteria are published in either the contract notice or the ITPD in accordance 
with the DSPCR Regulation 19(20). Contract award criteria must be assigned relative 
weightings (minimum to maximum range) or a descending order of significance. Up-
front disclosure of the contract criteria is a challenge when conducting competitive 
dialogue procedures; however, it permits the acquisition team to hold dialogue until the 
requirement is met (DSPCR, 2011).  
DSPCR Regulation 19 (23) puts a strict obligation on the acquisition team to 
adhere to equal treatment of all the participants and to ensure the security of the 
confidential information received from the tenderers (DSPCR, 2011). Tenderers may be 
asked before and during the conduct of dialogue to provide in writing which parts of the 
solutions they submitted can be revealed. DSPCR Guidance Chapter 8, Rule 26 clarifies 
that it is the responsibility of the bidder to specify what falls into the confidential 
category. However, it is at the discretion of the acquisition team whether to accept or 
deny such declarations from the tenderers (DE&S & MoD, 2014). 
DSPCR Regulation 19(24) allows the gradual elimination of tenderers through the 
application of the contract award criteria. DSPCR Guidance Chapter 8, Rule 34 points 
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out that during the process the requirements may mature to an extent where the award 
criteria becomes obsolete and requires revision (DE&S & MoD, 2014).  
The dialogue process formally closes with the issuance of the invitations to 
submit final bid (ITSFB). After receipt of ITSFB, no further dialogue is allowed (DSPCR 
Guidance, 2011).  
G. UNCITRAL LAW ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (UN MODEL) 
UN General Assembly resolution number 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 
formed the legal basis for the establishment of the UNCITRAL (UNCITRAL, 2014). The 
UNCITRAL Model Law of 1994 was updated in 2004. The UNCITRAL Model Law 
offers guidelines for public procurement in the UN. States can adopt the provisions of the 
model law based on its unique statutory requirements. 
1. Participation by Suppliers or Contractors 
Article 8 of UNCITRAL Model Law mandates that suppliers of all nationalities 
shall be allowed to participate in the procurement process. However, countries may 
restrict the participation of suppliers in the procurement process in accordance with the 
law of the land (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 9).  
2. Qualification of Suppliers and Contractors 
Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law describes the following criteria for the 
qualification of suppliers and contractors: 
• Suppliers have the necessary environmental, professional, and technical 
competencies, financial capacity, and managerial capability to execute 
contract. 
• Suppliers meet the ethical standards of the state. 
• Suppliers have adequate legal capacity. 
• Suppliers are not insolvent or administered by court-appointed officials, 
and business activities are not under suspension. 
• Taxes and social security obligations are fulfilled. 
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• Suppliers and their directors have not been convicted of criminal offenses 
(UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 10). 
3. Evaluation Criteria 
Article 11 of UNCITRAL Model Law lays the foundation for the evaluation 
criteria related to procurement. Criteria may include the following:  
• Price  
• Cost of maintaining, operating, and repairing goods; requirement 
characteristics; and environmental characteristics of requirement 
• Experience and professional competence of the contractor 
• Statutory requirements of state law (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 12) 
The solicitation documents set out the (a) evaluation criteria, which may be set on 
the basis of price or price and other criteria, (b) relative weights of the criteria, and (c) 
manner of application of evaluation criteria (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 13). 
4. Evaluating the Value of Procurement 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 12 lays the guidelines for procurement cost 
estimation. UNCITRAL Model Law restricts the division of requirements and requires 
the use of specific valuation methods for requirement cost estimation to ensure free and 
fair competition. The procurement authority shall “include the estimated maximum total 
value of the procurement contract. Contract cost estimation includes total value of the 
contract or all procurement contracts under the framework agreement over its entire 
duration” (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 14). 
5. Pre-Qualification Proceedings 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 18 defines the procedure to identify qualified 
suppliers and offerors prior to commencement of solicitation process. The pre-
qualification process commences with the publication of the invitation to pre-qualify. 
UNCITRAL Model Law encourages the procuring agency to publish the invitation to 
pre-qualify internationally (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 18). 
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6. Methods of Procurement 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 27 mentions 10 different procurement methods. 
This study focuses on the following methods: 
• RFP with dialogue 
• RFP with consecutive negotiations 
• Competitive negotiations (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 28) 
a. RFP with Dialogue 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 49 describes the procedure for RFPs with 
dialogue. Under this procedure, the acquisition team publishes an invitation RFP with 
dialogue proceedings. To limit the number of participants from which to request 
proposals, the acquisition team may engage in pre-selection procedures. Per UNCITRAL 
Model Law article 18, pre-selection proceedings have been discussed in the pre-
qualification procedures. The pre-selection process clearly describes how selection of the 
suppliers will be carried out. The pre-selection process should ensure participation of 
enough suppliers for effective competition. The acquisition team shall assign ratings 
during the pre-selection process to the suppliers that meet the criteria as mentioned in the 
invitation to pre-selection. Suppliers with the best ratings are then selected and informed. 
An RFP is issued to selected suppliers after the pre-selection process. The RFP details the 
method for proposal price estimation and criteria for proposal evaluation. A minimum of 
three suppliers shall be selected for the dialogue process. The acquisition team conducts 
dialogue with all the suppliers who submitted responsive proposals. Suppliers’ 
representatives cannot be changed during the dialogue process, and the subject matter of 
the procurement and the evaluation criteria cannot be modified by the acquisition team. 
The acquisition team shall request the presence of all suppliers at the time of submission 
of the final offer. Negotiations cannot take place after the submission of final offers 
(UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 52). 
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b. RFP with Consecutive Negotiations 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 50 explains the procedure for consecutive 
negotiations. Sound proposals with acceptable technical, quality, and performance 
characteristics are considered to be responsive proposals. The acquisition team evaluates 
the proposals and assigns merit rankings based on the evaluation criteria. These rankings 
are conveyed to the suppliers. The supplier with the best ranking is invited to participate 
in financial negotiations. Other suppliers with responsive proposals are informed that 
their proposals will be considered for financial negotiations if the negotiations with the 
first supplier fail. Should that happen, financial negotiations commence with the second 
ranked supplier. This process continues until the acquisition teams conclude a successful 
financial negotiation, and a contract is formed. During the financial negotiations process 
the requirement is not modified. The acquisition team may not reopen financial 
negotiations with suppliers whose financial negotiations have already been terminated 
(UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 52). 
c. Competitive Negotiations 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 30(4) explains the circumstances under which the 
acquisition team may engage in the competitive negotiations process: 
• Requirement is of urgent nature and other methods are time consuming. 
• Requirement arises because of a “catastrophic event” and normal 
processes are impractical. 
• The acquisition authority determines the use of any other procurement 
authority is not feasible owing to state security interests (UNCITRAL, 
2014, p. 31). 
Competitive negotiations are carried out with enough suppliers to ensure effective 
competition. During the competitive negotiations process, any requirement, clarification, 
and information is communicated to all the suppliers for equality and transparency 
purposes. After completion of financial negotiations, all the suppliers are requested to be 
present during the submission of their final offers. The acquisition team chooses the offer 
that best meets its needs (UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 54).   
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7. Two-Stage Tendering 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 48 describes a two-stage tendering process that is 
applicable to RFPs with dialogue, RFPs with negotiations, and competitive negotiations. 
In a two-stage tendering process, the procurement team requests tenders containing 
proposals without mentioning prices. The acquisition team may solicit a proposal 
containing technical and performance characteristics of the requirement. In the first stage 
of two-stage tendering, the acquisition team commences discussion with suppliers whose 
tenders have not been rejected. The acquisition team is responsible for ensuring all 
suppliers have an equal opportunity to participate in the discussion. In the second stage, 
suppliers present their revised technical proposals along with their price proposals. The 
final tenders submitted by suppliers are evaluated per the evaluation criteria 
(UNCITRAL, 2014, p. 48). 
In the previous sections, the U.S., the UK, and the UN procurement models have 
been discussed. In the following sections, the COSO framework in relation to 
procurement fraud is described for later analysis in order to make recommendations for 
Pakistan’s procurement system. 
H. COSO INTERNAL CONTROL FRAMEWORK  
The scope of internal control and its applicability in any modern-day 
comprehensive management framework is not limited to deterring and managing fraud. 
An internal control system is also expected to provide reasonable assurances regarding 
operations, reporting, and compliance objectives (COSO, 2013). The results of a survey 
conducted by Willis and Lightle (2000) show that 86% of corporate sector companies 
believe that internal controls only provide reasonable assurance. The specifics of internal 
controls may tend to differ for profit and non-profit organizations, as in today’s world, 
everybody seems to be taking risks, even governments, schools, and nonprofit groups 
(Grumet, 2009). For defense organizations, the mission requirements coupled with 
financial and non-financial objectives are the focus. Appropriate internal control 
procedures are required for each process of the procurement phases starting with the 
solicitation planning. In addition, an appropriate procurement model and an appropriate 
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contract type with solicitation documents and evaluation criteria are necessary. There is a 
need for a financial negotiations process in the public procurement system of Pakistan 
(Nazir & Nadeem 2015), as well as for a viable internal control framework. The 
implementation of internal controls may eventually lead to a reduction in operational 
problems, associated risks, and vulnerability for fraud (GAO, 1999). 
For a better understanding of the requirements for the internal control procedures 
in the financial negotiations process, consideration of a credible time-tested internal 
control framework is necessary. According to Willis and Lightle (1995) “conscientious 
managements are already sufficiently motivated to monitor their internal control systems” 
(p. 17). A well-recognized and time-tested internal control framework by the COSO was 
established in 1985 by several private sector organizations in the United States (COSO, 
2013). The mission of COSO is to provide “thought leadership through the development 
of comprehensive frameworks and guidelines on enterprise risk management, internal 
control, and fraud deterrence designed to improve organizational performance and 
governance and to reduce the extent of fraud in organizations” (as cited in Tan, 2013, p. 
22). COSO has presented a framework to enable adaptive dynamic organizations to meet 
their objectives by effectively and efficiently maintaining internal control structures 
within organizations (COSO, 2013). The COSO internal control framework is flexible 
and is generally modified per the legal framework of the implementing country or 
specific organization. The COSO internal control framework is primarily based on the 
following concepts, objectives, and components: 
1. Concepts  
The COSO’s integrated internal control framework defines the internal control 
process as follows: “Internal control is a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and 
compliance” (COSO, 2013, p. 39). 
The scope and methodology in internal control processes is very broad to allow 
management to conduct and oversee internal control systems and to select the areas 
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needing reforms and implementation. According to Metzger (2007), “In order to foster a 
positive control environment, management and employees should establish and maintain 
an environment throughout the organization that sets a positive and supportive attitude 
towards internal control and conscientious management” (p. 38). This leads to 
implementation of an internal control environment that has flexibility in the practical 
domain and sustainment in its entirety. The management sets the tone at the top by using 
an established set of standards of conduct. 
Internal controls differ from one organization to the other, mainly dependent on 
size, objectives, and nature of operations. For example, controls for financial reporting in 
an organization can be classified as preventive, detective, and corrective (Whittington & 
Pany, 2011). Any internal control procedure put in place in any organization or entity 
should help achieve the organization’s objectives. The organization adopts a mission and 
sets targets to achieve its mission. The internal control implementation is largely 
dependent on the managers and employees at every level of the organization to ensure the 
internal control procedures are working properly (COSO, 2013). 
2. Objectives 
The COSO framework divides the objectives into three broad categories to 
streamline the entity’s internal controls at each level of management starting from the top 
level to the lowest level. The COSO integrated internal control framework is designed to 
provide reasonable assurance of meeting the organization’s objectives. Internal control 
system effectiveness may vary over time, which helps in identifying and assessing the 
risks within the organization (Willis & Lightle, 2000). The categories of these objectives 
are as follows: 
a. Operations Objective 
The operations objective relates to the basic mission of an organization and is 
based on financial performance, productivity, customer satisfaction, and employee 
satisfaction. The operational objectives also vary for profit and nonprofit entities. Most 
organizations, including defense, have established internal controls systems to safeguard 
their assets (COSO, 2013). 
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b. Reporting Objective 
The production of reports for effective use by management and stakeholders is 
driven by the organization or the industry standards. The reporting objective includes 
internal and external financing as well as non-financing objectives. The content of reports 
may vary but the focus is on the effectiveness of internal controls (Willis & Lightle, 
2000). These types of objectives are different from other objectives because they may be 
driven by internal and external needs (COSO, 2013). 
c. Compliance Objective 
The compliance objective is driven by the applicable laws and regulations and 
sets forth the level of conduct expected from an organization’s employee. These 
objectives become part of the entity’s mission and must be understood by members of the 
organization or entity for performance at all levels of the organization (COSO, 2013). 
3. Components of Internal Control 
The internal control components and commonly applicable principles are 
recommended by the COSO for every organization (COSO, 2013). The five components 
that form the core of the related principles are as follows:  
• Control environment 
• Risk assessment  
• Control activities 
• Information and communication 
• Monitoring activities (COSO, 2013, p. 45) 
The management of any organization bears the main responsibility for the 
organization’s internal control system (Metzger, 2007). Making strategic decisions, 
selecting a capable board of directors for governance and oversight, and selecting and 
developing controls to mitigate the risks are all part of internal control processes based on 
the COSO components and related principles.  
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An understanding of each component of the COSO framework is imperative for 
setting up an internal control framework for the financial negotiations process in the 
procurement process. The following section describes the five internal control 
components along with the related principles.  
a. Control Environment 
The control environment forms the basis of setting up control procedures across 
an organization and forms an umbrella for four other internal control components 
(Noland & Matrejean, 2013). Once the methodology is established, methods and 
procedures and expectations are built around the control environment. The discipline and 
behaviors set the foundation, and the quality of the internal control system is further 
refined. Starting with the tone at the top, conduct standards, oversight, input, and 
documentation, the control environment focuses on the organizational structure and 
delegation of responsibilities (COSO, 2013; GAO 2014b). Moreover, this internal control 
component includes the recruitment, development, and retention of employees. This 
formal organizational control structure defines the areas of authority, responsibilities, and 
lines of reporting. The five principles in the control environment include the following:  
• Commitment to integrity and ethical values is demonstrated by the 
organization  
• The board of directors are independent from management and exercise  
oversight for performance of internal control and its refinement   
• The proper lines of reporting authorities and responsibilities are made 
effective by management with organizational objectives in sight 
• A commitment at every stage is shown by the organization in pursuit of 
workforce competence.  
• The accountability is critical for holding individuals responsible for their 
internal control responsibilities to meet the objectives of the organization 
(COSO, 2013, p. 20). 
Furthermore, an important aspect in the control environment is accountability. 
The management in any organization should enforce accountability for all individuals 
responsible for the internal control procedures. Through the timely performance appraisal 
of individuals, corrective actions should be taken. Management uses different tools to 
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help balance the employee workload periodically (GAO, 2014b). “The effectiveness of 
an organization’s internal control relies upon its leadership to set the tone at the top by 
enforcing control environment components” (Whittington & Pany, 2011, p. 248). 
b. Risk Assessment  
One of the most important factors in an internal control system is the correct and 
timely risk assessment process whereby the objectives are clearly defined and updated to 
meet new requirements (Whittington & Pany, 2011). Risks vary by types depending on 
the functions of the organization. For example, in financial organizations, there could 
always be the risk of fraud. For a government organization, risks could be bribery and 
other illegal acts leading to the waste and abuse of resources and power. When potential 
risks are identified, management should conduct a thorough analysis of the external and 
internal environment. If needed, the risk assessment strategy should be revised to ensure 
the achievement of the organizational objectives (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014b). The 
related principles for risk assessment in the COSO’s framework are as follows: 
• Specific, crystal-clear organizational objectives are set forth for timely 
identification and assessment of risks.  
• After the objectives are set, potential risk factors are analyzed for future 
courses of action.  
• Fraud risk elements that could undermine the objectives are also assessed.  
• Potential changes that significantly underscore internal controls are 
identified and analyzed (COSO, 2013, p. 20). 
An appropriate risk assessment level can only be achieved in an organization if 
the management constantly assesses the threats for all types of risks such as fraud, 
bribery, and other illegal acts (Noland & Metrejean, 2013). The risk assessment relates to 
timely detecting and responding to the risks (Porter, Simon, & Hatherly, 2014). The 
constant audit of risks and the constant revision in the internal control system are 
imperative for maintaining a viable minimum risk level (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014b). 
 50 
c. Control Activities 
Control activities are the diverse set of actions ascertained and put into place by 
the management to mitigate constantly arising risk levels in the internal control system 
(Noland & Metrejean, 2013). As per COSO’s framework, the control activities 
component is focused on the following three principles:  
• Control activities are set and developed by the organization for risk 
mitigation and objectives achievement. 
• General control activities over technology are developed and selected for 
objectives achievement.  
• Control activities are deployed by the organization through policies and 
procedures and integrated with the risk assessment and response functions 
with suitable placement in organizations (COSO, 2013, p.p. 20-21).  
Some examples of common categories of control activities are: 
• management of human capital, 
• top-level reviews of actual performance, 
• reviews by the management at all levels, 
• segregation of duties, 
• physical control over vulnerable assets, 
• controls over human processing, 
• performance reviews and indicators, 
• accurate and timely recording of transactions, 
• appropriate documentation of transactions and internal controls, and 
• access restrictions and accountability for all resources and records (GAO, 
2014b, p. 46). 
These control activities are designed to meet the objectives of accuracy and 
validity in the information processing system. Control activities may include the checks 
of data files, programs, and their backups. Control activities also apply to the application 
controls, which deal with the processing of data leading to accuracy, completeness, 
legitimacy, and concreteness of all performed transactions (GAO, 1999).  
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Furthermore, an important aspect in control activities is the segregation of duties 
within different tiers of the organization. In any organization, especially in a finance- 
related environment, segregation of duties can be defined as “no one individual should 
perform more than one of the functions of authorizing transactions, recording 
transactions, and maintaining custody over assets” (Whittington & Pany, 2011, p. 254). 
Segregation of duties reduces the risk of inappropriate and fraudulent actions. Through 
effective segregation of duties, the highly practiced management override of bypassing 
the established internal controls can be minimized (COSO, 2013). The likelihood of fraud 
can be reduced by segregation of duties. In addition, without collusion of at least two 
more employees, occurrence of fraud could be decreased. An example of segregation of 
duties in a finance-related environment could include having different personnel 
responsible for transaction authorizing, processing, and recording (GAO, 2014b).  
d. Information and Communications 
The importance of information in this technologically advanced age cannot be 
underestimated. Similarly, transmitting information at the right time to the right people 
within or outside the organization using the appropriate method is equally important. 
Information transmission is an ongoing process in which both the internal and external 
sources are used to provide management with useful, filtered, and relevant information 
for internal control responsibilities and managerial functions (Whittington & Pany, 2011). 
Information accessibility depends on the communication sources, like the use of an 
updated accounting information system, which can lead to benefits such as “proper 
execution of transactions, accurately and timely recording of transactions, access 
restrictions to and accountability for resources and records, appropriate documentation of 
transactions and internal control” (GAO, 2014b, p.  48). Open communication channels 
lead to proper functioning of an information system (Whittington & Pany, 2011). This is 
the key to the successful understanding of objectives by everyone in the organization and 
the roles expected of each individual for control responsibilities (COSO, 2013).  
The efficacy of the information communication system also supports the 
functioning of the other components of the internal control framework. For example, in 
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risk assessment, an increased dependency on the use of credit cards in meeting consumer 
demands through online sales creates an increased risk of possible breaches of 
information security. Management, through the better use of information and 
communication sources, can monitor the non-compliance of the privacy and security 
issues (GAO, 2014b). An effective transaction monitoring system can help in risk 
evaluations of credit card monitoring systems. Similarly, in a defense system, a better use 
of information and communication systems can help monitor the risks regarding the 
abuse of authority or financial powers. The information can be obtained either by the use 
of manual systems or through the use of modern information tools like electronic data 
interchange (EDI) or application programing interfaces (API) (Whittington & Pany, 
2011). However, keeping information filtered and quantified could reduce the risk 
associated with the hazards of information overload. Management can address these 
issues by keeping the quality of information accessible, correct, current, valid, and 
verifiable. The establishment of information management policies with clear lines of 
responsibility and accountability is the main responsibility of management. This holds 
true during communication within an organization, where robust controls are needed to 
ensure the confidential and foolproof relay of information (COSO, 2013). The following 
principles relate to improving information and communication in any organization: 
• Quality information is generated and used by the organization to 
effectively support the internal control system.  
• Information is internally communicated, including objectives and 
responsibilities required to support the internal control system.  
• Communication with external parties is done on matters affecting the other 
components of the internal control system (COSO, 2013, p. 21). 
One of the most important aspects in relaying information within an organization 
is the willingness of employees to report to appropriate stakeholders. This can only be 
achieved through added confidence of the employees and managers or subordinate 
officers that the information and communication issues being faced would be dealt with 
promptly (Whittington & Pany, 2011). This immediate and timely remedial action can 
only be possible through a very effective information communication system in place for 
lower, middle, and top-level management. This communication system should include a 
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number of sources available, such as frequent meetings at all levels, social media, 
memoranda, e-mails, and presentations. Having all these checks and balances in effect, 
would ensure added confidence that the internal control procedures are working properly 
(COSO, 2013). 
e. Monitoring Activities 
With changing times, the organization’s objectives may change, leading to 
necessary changes in the internal control system (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). The 
organization’s internal control procedures can also become redundant and questionable 
over time. To modify or design new internal control procedures to address changing 
requirements, management needs valuable, timely, and constant inputs. Constant 
evaluation of existing internal controls by management is only possible through sound 
monitoring activities. This monitoring would give management an idea about the 
effectiveness of the controls in order to ensure that the five components of internal 
control remain functional and effective (COSO, 2013). 
The monitoring system can be based on two main drivers: ongoing evaluations 
and separate evaluations. A mix of both drivers can be used by management to monitor 
the rate of change and establish a basic understanding of the current state of changes 
taking place. According to Merten, Severance, and White (1981), “a company’s 
assessments of the effectiveness of its present internal control system in response to its 
environment is a key determinant of whether, it will, in fact, improve its internal control” 
(p. 52). The assessments can be done by evaluating selected individuals within the 
organization. The frequency, as well as scope, can be varied by management per the 
threat perception and forecasted risk. The ongoing evaluations form an integral part of the 
design and operation of internal controls and provide timely information and solid 
evidence. The separate evaluations are based on management’s judgment regarding when 
these evaluations will be conducted and what the intended scope is in each situation 
(COSO, 2013). All these monitoring system activities should be done on a regular basis, 
backed by sound reporting channels to appropriate management levels. In addition to the 
monitoring activities conducted by the internal auditors, monitoring can be outsourced to 
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external auditors per the nature of the organization’s work processes. These outsourced 
audits should be monitored and supplemented by organizational internal control checks to 
verify the outsourced service provider interfaces with the organization’s own internal 
control audits (COSO, 2013). The related principles for monitoring activities in the 
COSO’s framework are as follows:  
• Ongoing or separate evaluations are selected or developed to ascertain the 
presence and operation of internal control functions.  
• Internal control deficiencies are evaluated and communicated in a timely 
manner to tiers within or outside the organization, such as senior 
management and the board of directors responsible for taking remedial 
actions (COSO, 2013, p. 21). 
Once the internal control shortcomings are conveyed to the appropriate people at 
an organizational level or through the chain of command, management’s responsibility 
should then focus on corrective actions. Any delay in the rectification process can lead to 
a risky situation and could result in further weakening of the internal control system 
(COSO, 2013). The following section discusses the summary of principles governing 
internal control components and their direct relationship. 
4. Summary of Principles Governing Internal Control Components – 
GAO Perspective 
Like any other organizational hierarchy, an internal control environment is based 
on some principles that support the design, implementation, and operational aspects of 
the control environment. The GAO’s Green book has adopted the COSO framework 
along with the 17 principles to satisfy the governmental level internal controls. This 
process leads to an effective internal control system with components based on clearly 




Figure 9.  Internal Control Components and Principles. 
Source: Burns & Simer (2013, p. 3).  
 
While the components and principles work in their own domain, a direct 
relationship exists between the organizational structure, components, and objectives of 
the organization, as shown in Figure 10 (COSO, 2013, p. 46).  
 
Figure 10.  2013 COSO Cube. Source: COSO (2013). 
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After having discussed the internal control standards and the widely accepted 
COSO integrated internal control framework in use, it is important to discuss the fraud 
issues associated with the procurement process, specifically with financial negotiations in 
the defense procurement process. An inadequate and ineffective internal control system 
in the financial negotiations environment can lead to fraud vulnerabilities. The next 
section focuses on the types of procurement frauds specifically associated with the 
procurement process in relation to internal controls.  
I. PROCUREMENT FRAUD IN RELATION TO INTERNAL CONTROLS 
In simple terms, the procurement process follows a set life cycle that is based on a 
pattern starting with procurement planning and ending with contract closeout, as shown 
in Figure 11. An effective internal control system is vitally important throughout the 
procurement process. However, its importance becomes more critical in solicitation and 
source selection. Furthermore, throughout the phases of contract management, the 
potential for fraud may increase substantially. 
 
Figure 11.  Process Contract Management. Source: Rendon (2008). 
 
The concept of fraud includes a wide scope of actions ranging from misuse to 
misapplication, deception to concealment, lying to cheating, to any sort of dishonesty. 
The fraud triangle, which includes pressure, opportunity, and rationalization components, 
is a model for understanding the most recent ideas surrounding the concept of fraud, 
particularly the conditions that lead to fraud (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12.  The Fraud Triangle. Source: Columbia University Finance Gateway 
(n.d.). 
 
Procurement fraud is fast becoming a common occurrence globally, especially in 
defense contracting, due to huge budgets and the large amount of procurement conducted 
each year. Procurement fraud is a complex problem that has been defined as follows:  
Illegal conduct, by which the offender gains an advantage, avoids an 
obligation or causes damage to his organization. The offender might be an 
employee, owner, an official, a public figure or a vendor who was 
involved in the purchase of services, goods or assets for the affected 
organization. (Surveilligence, 2011).  
Procurement fraud is not just limited to contracting, it can also be related to 
procurement functions, including financial negotiations. In financial negotiations, of the 
three elements of the fraud triangle, opportunity plays a major role. Weak internal 
controls create an opportunity for fraud. To understand this concept, some of the schemes 
in the procurement fraud categories are discussed in the next section. 
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J. PROCUREMENT FRAUD SCHEME CATEGORIES  
Procurement fraud occurs in many different categories that may involve a wide 
range of stakeholders. More specifically, procurement fraud revolves around two main 
stakeholders: 
• individuals within the procuring organization and 
• individuals outside the procuring organization who are directly involved in 
the procurement process.  
1. Collusion among Main Stakeholders 
Collusion is defined by Merriam-Webster as “a secret agreement or cooperation 
especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose” (“Collusion,” n.d.). This definition signifies 
the variability in different methodologies that can be used in fraud collusions. The main 
stakeholders are the ones doing the procurement process, forming the core of the 
collusion fraud scheme. However, the most common forms of collusion in fraud schemes 
among main stakeholders include the following: 
• Product / service need recognition 
• Bid specification tailoring 
• Bid tailoring / rigging to meet threshold requirements 
• Conflicts of interests with personal interest 
• Bid manipulation for unfair advantage (as cited in Tan, 2013) 
The most specific collusion fraud scheme that leads to fraud in financial 
negotiations in the procurement process is collusion between the procuring agencies and 
the contractors. “The combined efforts of fraudsters enable them to circumvent or 
override anti-fraud controls” (ACFE, 2012, p. 43). The procuring agency represented by 
the government official may collude with the contracting party to obtain personal gifts, 
kickbacks, or bribes (ACFE, 2016; Tan, 2013). According to the research findings by 
Rendon and Rendon (2015), besides collusion, organizations are most susceptible to 
conflicts of interest. 
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2. Conflicts of Interest 
Conflict of interest is another very common type of fraud that causes significant 
damage to an organization. It is classified as a form of corruption under the occupational 
fraud and abuse classification system (ACFE, 2016).  This type of occupational fraud can 
arise at any time in the procurement process, when persons involved have self-interests in 
conflict with organizational responsibilities (Tan, 2013). Another form of this type of 
fraud can involve multiple employees of the same organization who can act in unity to 
achieve their fraud scheme related to conflicts of interest. In conflicts of interest “an 
employee misuses his or her influence in a business transaction in a way that violates his 
or her duty to the employer in order to gain a direct or indirect benefit” (ACFE, 2016, p. 
90). 
3. Bid Rigging through Collusion among Supplying Firms 
Bid rigging is a fraud scheme in which bidding firms collude with each other to 
bypass the competition. It is also classified as a form of corruption under the occupational 
fraud and abuse classification system (ACFE, 2016). In this type of fraud scheme, the 
prices are inflated up to the desired level by the bidding firms. “If most bid prices are 
high, and one is low, that is an obvious anomaly” (Piper, 2012, p. 4) leading to bid 
rigging red flags.  
4. Price Billing and Cost Schemes 
Price billing and cost schemes are types of fraud that are very difficult to uncover 
when dealing with the public procurement system. The procurement staffs of a public 
procurement organization have little knowledge of and insight into the working processes 
of the contracting firm, resulting in misinterpretation of costs by using various inflated 
methods. This situation leads to billing for products and services that are never rendered. 
The stronger the internal control and fraud detection systems within the procuring 
organization, the better the defense can be raised against this type of fraud scheme 
(Castillo & Flanigan, 2014). 
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5. Fraudulent Representation and Fraudulent Purchases 
Fraud schemes involving fraudulent representation and fraudulent purchases are 
common, and occur in many government or commercial systems. The items purchased 
with business funds are actually intended for personal use, leading to fraud, the 
unnecessary use of procurement funds, and wasted money. Similarly, related to this 
scheme are frauds with respect to the purchase of substitute goods and services that do 
not conform to the required specifications. Both of these schemes are a waste of 
government funds (Castillo & Flanigan, 2014). 
These fraud schemes can all be seen in an interrelationship that makes 
procurement-related fraud a reality. The possibility of fraud exists at any level, starting 
from the procurement planning to the calling of bids, engaging in negotiations, and 
finalizing of the purchase deal to the signing of the procurement contract (Castillo & 
Flanigan, 2014). The fraud matrix shown in Figure 13 (Rendon & Rendon, 2015) as an 
audit conceptual framework highlights the significance of internal controls and their 
efficacy in addressing organizational weaknesses at each level in the procurement 
process. 
  
Figure 13.   Matrix-Procurement Fraud. Source: Rendon & Rendon (2015). 
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Procurement fraud in relation to perceived internal controls relates to different 
procurement fraud schemes. The increased vulnerability to procurement fraud in defense 
procurement can never be underestimated, as it consumes the majority of the public 
budget. The unique nature of the defense market is based on four main factors:  
• Technological pace 
• Long term/period 
• Budgetary aspect 
• Volatile nature (Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21) 
 Keeping these factors in mind can help one understand the defense procurement 
contracting dynamics and the overriding fraud risks associated with each phase of the 
procurement process. Some of the common possible fraud vulnerabilities associated with 
the different procurement process phases are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Examples of Typical Risks and Fraud Vulnerabilities in the 
Procurement Process. Adapted from Office of the Inspector General (as 
cited in Tan, 2013). 
Procurement Process Phases Possible Fraud Vulnerabilities/ 
Typical Associated Risks 
Procurement Planning 
 
- Market survey inadequacy 
- Project planning inadequacy 
- Need recognition scheme  
- Tailoring of bid 
 
Solicitation Planning - Inadequate or inappropriate and 
incomplete evaluation criteria usage 
- Incomplete and inadequate 
consideration of special terms and 
conditions   
- Procurement method inappropriateness 
- Contract type inappropriateness  
- Inappropriate/unjustified sole source 
award scheme  
- Bid manipulation and splitting 
Solicitation - Subcontracting fraud 
- Receipt of insufficient bids 
-Manipulation of bids 
- Bid rigging of bids 
- Inadequate or potential suppliers not 
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Procurement Process Phases Possible Fraud Vulnerabilities/ 
Typical Associated Risks 
responding 
Source Selection - Established evaluation criteria 
compliance failure 
- Conflict of interest  
- Terms, conditions and price 
- Budget insufficiency 
- Unqualified contractor selection 
- Negotiation failure for a reasonable 
contract  
Contract Administration - Repeated failure of acceptance test by 
the contractor  
- Sub-standard goods delivery 
- Unable to reach agreement on the 
negotiated settlement 
- Shell company scheme 
- Cost overruns  
- Fluctuation of foreign exchange rate  
- Schedule delay 
Contract Closeout - No proper closeout 
 
The procurement workforce must know the existing relationship between 
procurement process phases and ineffective internal control components vis-à-vis fraud 
vulnerabilities (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). After identifying each associated risk, the 
organization can also develop internal controls for its future risk management. That 
future risk management is dependent, however, on the significance of the impact on the 
organization and the probability of occurrence of the risk (Tan, 2013). For example, in 
the solicitation planning phase, the risk of contract type inappropriateness has a greater 
likelihood of occurrence than bid manipulation and splitting. Similarly, in the 
procurement planning phase, the tailoring of the bid is less likely to occur than market 
survey inadequacy.   
K. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the Pakistan procurement management stages and rules of 
procurement (PPRA rules 2004), which regulate the public procurement followed in 
Pakistan were discussed. The need to incorporate the financial negotiations process for 
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PPRA rules was addressed. Additionally, the contract management phases with emphasis 
on the financial negotiations process involved in each phase were discussed. Elements of 
financial negotiations, deduced from the CPRG, were reviewed and summarized to form 
the basis for further analysis of contemporary procurement models. This led to a detailed 
review of the U.S., UK, and UN procurement models and focused on the financial 
negotiations process of these models for subsequent comparative analysis. 
COSO integrated internal control components, along with associated principles, 
were discussed in detail to develop a suitable internal control system for the financial 
negotiations process in Pakistan’s procurement system. A credible and time-tested 
internal control framework is considered a mandatory requirement for better 
understanding requirements for internal control in the financial negotiations process. The 
efficacy of the procurement system demands that each of the five internal control 
components be implemented in an integrated manner for best results.  
Furthermore, different procurement fraud scheme categories were discussed for 
better comprehension of fraud possibilities in procurement scenarios. According to Tan 
(2013), “People who think that fraudulent acts will be detected often will be discouraged 
from committing the acts” (p. 36). Additionally, a few possible fraud vulnerabilities 
along with typically associated risks were discussed in relation to the procurement 
process phases. 
The next chapter covers the methodology followed in this research study for an 
analysis of internal control requirements for the financial negotiations process, as well as 
an analysis of the different procurement models. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
This chapter outlines the methodology used to conduct this research study. This 
research addresses a dual set of audiences, that is, the United States (U.S.) and the 
Pakistani acquisition communities. This research discusses various data sources at length 
to address the unique requirements of a dual set of audiences. Data sources include 
negotiation processes in the Pakistan acquisition model, the U.S. acquisition model, the 
United Kingdom (UK) acquisition model, and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, as well as the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) internal control framework.  
A. DATA SOURCES 
The data (the U.S., UK and United Nations [UN] procurement models) used in 
this research are focused on designing a suitable financial negotiations process and 
related internal controls for the procurement system in Pakistan. It is important to 
understand the roots of the procurement methodology currently in place. Pakistan’s 
present procurement system is mainly based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 1994. 
However, updated UNCITRAL Model Law allows financial negotiations in competitive 
procurement procedures. The Pakistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
(PPRA), however, has not developed a detailed financial negotiations process and related 
internal control guidelines in line with contemporary procurement models. 
To better understand and substantiate the lack of a financial negotiations process 
and related internal controls, the data sources begin with a brief overview of PPRA 2004, 
the understanding of which forms the foundation for looking into the financial 
negotiations processes of modern acquisition models. The financial negotiations 
processes practiced by advanced acquisition models, including the U.S. Acquisition 
Model (Federal Acquisition Regulations [FAR] and Contract Price Reference Guide 
[CPRG]), the UK Acquisition Model (Defense and Security Public Contracts Regulations 
[DSPCR]), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (UNCITRAL), are 
discussed in detail. General aspects of the models emphasize the relevance of the 
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financial negotiations process in the overall acquisition framework. However, the focus 
remains on the financial negotiations processes of the different acquisition models to lay 
the foundation for further analysis. 
When financial negotiations are carried out in isolation without any form of 
internal controls, they can lead to an inherent risk of fraud. To address this aspect, a 
substantive, well-placed internal control model study is deemed necessary to design a 
future path for financial negotiations to take place in Pakistan. The COSO internal control 
framework that has been successfully tailored and implemented in organizations like the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) was chosen for this research study. This internal 
control framework provides a complete guide for meeting all organizational objectives at 
each tier of the financial negotiations process.  
B. DATA ANALYSIS  
Elements of a financial negotiations process, discussed in the CPRG, are used as a 
primary framework for the analysis of the U.S., the UK, and the UN acquisition models. 
These models are analyzed to identify best practices and to find suitable processes that 
can be recommended for inclusion in the PPRA 2004 rules for conduct of financial 
negotiations for the Pakistan defense procurement.  
An analysis of the present system (i.e., PPRA 2004 rules) has revealed areas 
pertaining to pre-award and award phases where financial negotiations planning 
processes are involved. Thereafter, a review of procedures and methods of procurements 
help identify in depth the internal control framework specifically needed within the 
financial negotiations process in the Pakistan procurement system.   
C. SUMMARY   
This chapter presented the methodology for this research and discussed the 
sources of the data. It described the basis of the development of the rationale for the need 
of a financial negotiations process in Pakistan and for the need of internal controls for the 
financial negotiations process in Pakistan’s procurement system. Chapter IV provides the 
research findings, analysis, implications of the findings, and recommendations for the 
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Director General Defence Procurement (DGDP) in initiating and improving internal 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis and is presented in two parts. The 
first part analyzes the financial negotiations processes of the United States (U.S.) model, 
the United Kingdom (UK) model, and United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law to draw recommendations for the Pakistan public 
procurement system. The second part discusses the application of internal controls for 
financial negotiations processes and recommends policy guidelines for the Pakistan 
public procurement system.  
As discussed earlier, limitations on financial negotiations were imposed due to 
corruption issues in the Pakistan procurement system.  However, the need for financial 
negotiations has been realized by the Pakistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
(PPRA). In addition, PPRA has recommended an e-procurement portal that may also 
support online negotiations (PPRA, 2013). A comparative analysis of the financial 
negotiations process of the U.S. model, the UK model, and UNCITRAL Model Law (UN 
Model) is discussed in the following sections. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF FINANCIAL 
NEGOTIATIONS PROCESSES 
1. Marketing Research 
Market research is mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) in the 
U.S. procurement model. The Contract Price Reference Guide (CPRG) Volume I 
provides market research objectives, guidelines, and methods. The U.S. model 
comprehensively incorporates the mandated market research objectives in its model so 
the acquisition team has a better understanding of the prevailing market conditions when 
entering negotiations. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has determined that 
market research guidance in the Department of Defense (DOD) is in accordance with the 
FAR in terms of its objective and “builds on the techniques for communicating with 
industry outlined in FAR” (GAO, 2014a, summary). However, the GAO has identified 
that federal agencies failed to document the basic elements of market research, which 
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limits the ability of an acquisition team to make informed decisions about future 
procurements (GAO, 2014a). 
The UK acquisition cycle discusses exploring options for satisfying the 
requirement of market research. Options are explored with the collaboration of the 
industry through market research. The UK model uses a variety of tools to conduct 
market research, and its tendering processes use prior identification notices to inform 
industry of forthcoming requirements. The UK model also uses request for information 
forms to obtain rough order of magnitude costs, which guide procurement decisions 
(MoD, 2015). The UK model, like UNCITRAL, uses pre-qualification questionnaires 
(PQQ) to shortlist suppliers by the acquisition team to receive an invitation to tender 
(ITT) (MoD, 2015). However, these procedures cannot be taken as market research in the 
classic sense as market research is about better understanding the market, the cost drivers, 
the suppliers, and existing commercial options available to fulfill the requirements. 
Defense and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCR) do not mandate market 
research as their U.S. counterpart, the FAR, does in the U.S. model. 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 6 mandates informing potential suppliers about 
future planned requirements and procurements (UNCITRAL, 2014). However, 
UNCITRAL does not mandate market research for public procurement as the U.S. model 
does. The UNCITRAL uses the PQQ procedures like the UK model only to ascertain the 
qualification of the potential suppliers.  
The U.S. model comprehensively lays down the guidelines, methods, and 
techniques for market research for better understanding of the market, the cost factors, 
the potential sellers, and existing commercial options available to fulfill the requirements. 
The U.S. model mandates market research, whereas the DSPCR and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law do not. 
2. Maximizing Competition 
The U.S., UK, and UN procurement models all have open competitive negotiated 
procedures for public procurement (see Table 2). All three procurement models have 
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negotiated procurement procedures that encourage maximum and open participation by 
potential sellers.  
Table 2.   Open Competitive Negotiation Procedures of the U.S Model, the UK 
Model, and the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Type of 
Competition 


























To maximize competition, the UK and the UN competitive negotiated 
procurement procedures respectively mandate/recommend a minimum of three 
participants for the procurement process. Restricting the minimum number of participants 
encourages more competition during the negotiation process. The U.S. model allows the 
acquisition team to subjectively set the competitive range to increase or decrease the 
number of participants before the start of the negotiation process. However, the UK 
model and the UNCITRAL Model Law use PQQ to filter the potential offerors.  
The UK and the UN negotiated procurement processes respectively 
mandate/recommend a minimum number of participants in the negotiated procurement 
processes compared to the U.S. model, which allows subjective setting of the competitive 
range, by the acquisition team. 
3. Appropriate Contract Types 
The U.S. FAR and the UK commercial policy tool kit: Pricing - Target Cost 
Incentive Fee Full Guidance procurement models discuss the selection of appropriate 
contract types for competitive negotiated procurements. The U.S. and the UK models 
mandate documentation of risk identification and mitigation (“risk owning” in the case of 
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the UK model) during the contract type selection process. The U.S. and the UK models 
give consideration to the type and complexity of the requirement in selecting contract 
type and have well-established procedures for cost and price analyses that support the 
selection of different types of contracts. Both models use fixed-price and cost-type 
contracts as appropriate for the requirement.  
The UK model has developed broad ranges for dividing the split between the 
price and non-price factors. This split (see Figure 6 in chapter II) guides the acquisition 
team in selecting the appropriate contract type. In the U.S. model, the acquisition team 
selects the contract type based on the requirements, and sellers usually accept the contract 
type. The U.S. model also allows offerors to negotiate a change to the contract type 
through the financial negotiations process. The objectives of the contract type negotiation 
are reasonable seller’s risk and efficient performance. The UNCITRAL Model Law does 
not have any criteria or procedure for contract type selection.  
The U.S. model and UK model allow the use of different types of contracts 
according to the requirement. The U.S model offers flexibility in contract type selection 
through the financial negotiations process. The acquisition team may negotiate the best 
suitable contract type according to the requirement and risk as compared to the UK 
model, which offers strict guidelines for contract type selection.  
4. Best Value Continuum 
The FAR mandates the use of best value continuum to get the best value for the 
taxpayers’ dollar. The best value continuum is typically depicted with lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection on one end and tradeoff source selection 
on the other. LPTA source selections are often associated with firm fixed-price (FFP) 
contracts, while tradeoff source selections are often associated with cost-type contracts, 
although those pairings are not mandated. In the U.S. procurement model, the integrated 
project teams (IPTs) develop the evaluation criteria and assign weightage to each factor 
according to the dictates of the requirement to get the best value. The U.S. model insists 
that price is the most important factor for LPTA acquisitions. However, for tradeoff 
source selections, price is not the most important factor. IPTs develop the relative 
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importance of evaluation criteria according to the dictates of each requirement.  The U.S. 
procurement model does not give any split or broad ranges for the price factor as the UK 
model does. 
The UK procurement model uses a DSPCR guide (see Figure 6 in chapter II) to 
decide the split between the price and other factors to achieve best value. The guide 
provides guidance in the form of a decision chart depicting the split between price and 
other criteria in broad ranges. The UK model uses the most economically advantageous 
tender (MEAT), which allows the acquisition team to account for the price and non-price 
evaluation factors to get the best value for the contract.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law allows proposal evaluation on price and other than 
price factors. The UNCITRAL Model Law allows evaluation criteria other than price 
factors. However, like the U.S. model, the UNCITRAL model does not give guidance on 
assigning weights to the evaluation criteria.  
The U.S. model, the UK model, and the UNCITRAL Model Law allow proposal 
evaluation on relative weightage assigned to each factor. The U.S. model allows IPTs to 
develop evaluation criteria according to the requirement and offers more flexibility to the 
acquisition team than compared to the UK model, which lays broad ranges for the price 
factor for MEAT source selections.  
5. Cost and Price Analysis  
The U.S. model lays down financial thresholds for price and cost analysis. 
Requirements using simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) do not require price or cost 
analysis. For price analysis (in fixed-price type contracts), the U.S. model usually accepts 
price comparison of different proposals as a form of price analysis. For the cost analysis 
(in cost and fixed-price contracts), the U.S. model goes beyond cost evaluation and 
mandates a cost realism analysis for determining the reasonableness of the proposed 
expenditures to complete the effort (requirement). Comprehensive procedures are laid 
down in CPRG to evaluate the costs as allowable and reasonable. Cost accounting 
standards (CAS) are implemented to achieve uniformity in financial reporting. The U.S. 
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procurement model has extensive procedures in place to evaluate price and cost 
reasonableness. 
In the UK procurement model, the price is usually assessed relative to the average 
price submitted. For the cost analysis, cost assurance and analysis services (CAAS) 
assess the direct and indirect costs with associated risks and profit included in the 
financial proposal. The UK procurement model also caters to variations in prices of 
materials and wages. An important difference is the post-costing concept, in which the 
UK model carries out an audit of the contractor's books to obtain information for future 
contracts. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) commercial policy guidelines lay down 
extensive procedures on the price and cost analysis.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law allows proposal evaluation on the basis of 
weightage assigned to price and non-price factors. However, unlike the U.S. and UK 
procurement models, the UNCITRAL does not give detailed guidance on the price and 
cost analysis. The UNCITRAL Model Law mentions specific methods for contract cost 
estimation but does not provide a discussion of these methods. 
The U.S. model and the UK model have elaborate procedures for contract cost 
and price analysis. Both models use the same approach for price analysis, cost analysis, 
and accounting standards. In addition to the cost and price analyses, the UK 
model mandates post-costing to collect data to analyze the cost of future contracts. 
6. Negotiations Exchanges 
All three procurement models have open competitive negotiated procurement 
procedures to facilitate negotiations between the acquisition team and potential sellers. 
The U.S. procurement model structures the negotiation exchanges into clarifications, 
exchanges, and discussions. This structured approach promotes clarity and defines 
expectations about the scope of exchanges during each stage of the contract management 
process.  
The UK procurement model does not follow the same structured approach as the 
U.S. procurement model. The UK procurement model allows negotiations in successive 
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stages where the number of the participants is reduced in each successive stage. The UK 
procurement models allows communication with the offerors through a bidders’ 
conference. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law conducts negotiations in three methods: (a) 
negotiations with selected offerors simultaneously after the pre-qualification process, (b) 
negotiations with one offeror at a time, and (c) negotiations with all the offerors 
simultaneously. However, unlike the U.S. procurement model, this model does not 
structure or define the type of exchanges for each stage.  
7. Summary of Results 
Table 3 shows a summary of the comparison of the financial negotiations process 
of the U.S., the UK, and the UNCITRAL Model Law (UN Model). 
 
Table 3.   Summary of the Comparison of the Financial Negotiations Processes 
of the U.S. Model, the UK Model, and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
Element of 
Negotiations 










appended in FAR 
• Not a statutory 
requirement  









• Open competitive 
negotiated 
procedure 
• Subjective setting of 
competitive range to 
allow number of 
participants  
• Open competitive 
negotiated 
procedure 
• Mandated minimum 
number of 
participants 










• Use of PQQ to 
filter potential 
sellers 
Appropriate • Risk identification 
and mitigation 
• Risk identification 
and mitigation 









• Use of different 
contract types 




• Contract type 
commensurate with 
risk ownership 
• Use of different 
contract types 
• Contract type 
selection—
Guidance provided 
for deciding fixed or 
cost-type contracts 





• Flexibility in 
assigning weightage 
to evaluation factors  






• DSPCR guidance 
on split between 
price and non-price 
factors 














• Price analysis 
based on price 
comparison of 
different proposals 




for cost type 
contracts 
• Accounting 
standards for cost 
evaluation 
• Price analysis 








for cost type 
contracts 
• Accounting 




• Allows price 
and cost 
determination 








• Scope of 




• Scope of 
negotiations for 
each stage not 
defined  
• Scope of 
negotiations for 




B. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS REGARDING 
FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 
1. Recommendations on Financial Negotiations Process for PPRA 
Based on the comparative analysis and findings of financial negotiations 
processes of the U.S. model, the UK model, and UNCITRAL Model Law, this research 
study recommends six elements of financial negotiations, which includes market 
research; maximizing competition; appropriate contract type; best value continuum; cost 
and price analysis; and negotiation exchanges, be incorporated in the PPRA rules 2004. 
The following changes to the PPRA rules 2004 to monitor and control the financial 
negotiations process are recommended based on this research study analysis: 
a. Market Research 
Mandating the conduct of market research by the acquisition agency sets the stage 
for financial negotiations. The objective of the market research is to establish the 
financial aspects of the requirement prevalent in the market. The U.S model for 
conducting market research offers detailed guidelines, objectives, and procedures for the 
conduct of market research. PPRA lacks statutes for the conduct of market research, so it 
is recommended that PPRA amend the PPRA Rules to mandate market research based on 
the U.S. model. 
b. Maximizing Competition 
Open competitive negotiated procurement procedures are a prerequisite for 
conducting financial negotiations. PPRA does not currently have an open competitive 
negotiated procurement procedure in Pakistan and will need to incorporate one to conduct 
financial negotiations. The UK model and the UNCITRAL Model Law recommend a 
minimum of three participants for the negotiated procurement process. Inviting a 
minimum of three participants will maximize competition, leverage financial 
negotiations, and ensure transparency of the financial negotiations process. It is 
recommended that the PPRA incorporate the open competitive negotiated procedure in its 
two-stage, two-envelope bidding process based on the UK/UNCITRAL model.  
 78 
c. Appropriate Contract Type 
Limitations on financial negotiations have restricted the contract types in PPRA 
rules 2004 to only fixed-price contracts. The U.S. model and UK model use different 
types of contracts according to the dictates of the requirement.  The U.S. model allows 
flexibility for the acquisition team to negotiate the appropriate contract type during the 
financial negotiations process. The objective is to ensure the contract type is 
commensurate with the complexity and risk of the requirement. It is recommended that 
the PPRA adopt the U.S. model to incorporate cost-type contracts and negotiation 
procedures.  
d. Best Value Continuum 
The concept of best value is already embedded in PPRA rules 2004. However, 
excluding financial negotiations has tilted the balance of the best value continuum in 
favor of LPTA source selections. The U.S. model and the UK model mandate the use of 
the best value continuum and offer detailed guidance on assigning weightage to 
evaluation criteria to achieve best value. The U.S. model allows the acquisition team 
more flexibility to formulate the evaluation criteria to meet the needs of the requirement. 
It is recommended that the PPRA amend the rules pertaining to evaluation criteria and 
allow the acquisition team to assign weightage to the price and non-price factors to 
restore the balance of the best value continuum aligning with the U.S. model.  
e. Cost and Price Analysis 
Detailed procedures for analyzing the cost and price of the proposal are required 
to leverage the financial negotiations process. The objective of the cost and price analysis 
is to determine reasonable and allowable costs. The PPRA uses LPTA in a two-stage, 
two-envelope bidding procedure. The U.S. model has comprehensive procedures for cost 
and price analysis. It is recommended that the PPRA incorporate detailed guidance on 
cost and price analysis into the PPRA rules 2004 to align with the U.S. model. It is 
recommended that the PPRA develop requisite expertise and standardize accounting 
procedures for firms seeking public contracts for effective cost and price analysis. 
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f. Negotiation Exchanges 
The concept of negotiation exchanges is not new for PPRA, as technical 
negotiations are already allowed in PPRA rules 2004. The objective of the financial 
negotiations is to get the best value by allowing negotiators to trade cost/price for another 
capability (technical, past performance, and so forth). The U.S. model offers a structured 
approach for conducting financial negotiations at each stage of the procurement process. 
It is recommended that the PPRA incorporate this structured approach into PPRA rules 
2004 with detailed guidance on the conduct of financial negotiations based on the U.S. 
model. 
Table 4 shows a summary of the recommendations for incorporation in PPRA 
rules 2004 for conducting financial negotiations. 
 
Table 4.   Summary of Recommendations for Incorporation in the 
PPRA Rules 2004 
Elements of Negotiations Recommendations 
Market research • Mandate market research in the PPRA rules. 
• The U.S. Model of market research may be adopted. 
Maximizing competition • Incorporation of open competitive negotiated procedure in 
PPRA existing two-stage-two-envelope bidding process. 
• The UNCITRAL Model Law/UK model for maximizing 
competition may be followed. 
Appropriate contract type • Incorporate cost-type contracts in PPRA rules. 
• The U.S. model of different types of contracts and their 
selection may be adopted. 
Best value continuum • Amendment in the PPRA rules to incorporate evaluation 
criteria according to the requirement. 
• The U.S. model of best value continuum may be adopted. 
Cost and price analysis • Incorporate guidance on cost and price analysis in PPRA 
rules. 
• Development of cost and price analysis expertise by the 
PPRA. 
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Elements of Negotiations Recommendations 
• Standardize CAS. 
• The U.S. model on cost and price analysis may be adopted. 
Negotiation exchanges • Guidance on structured approach to conduct negotiation 
exchanges in the PPRA rules. 
• The U.S. model’s guidance on conduct of negotiations may 
be incorporated in the PPRA rules. 
 
In the previous section, the comparative analysis of the financial negotiations 
processes of the U.S. model, the UK model, and the UNCITRAL Model Law was 
discussed along with recommendations for incorporation in to the PPRA rules. In the 
following section, the internal controls for the financial negotiations process are 
analyzed, and the recommended policy guidelines are provided. 
C. APPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNAL 
CONTROLS FOR FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS 
The process of negotiations holds certain levels of pros and cons as highlighted by 
Nazir and Nadeem (2015). The exercise of negotiations in the procurement process 
without proper internal controls would be disadvantageous and could lead to any of the 
following frequently observed scenarios: 
• Conflict of interest of contracting parties 
• Weak negotiations leading to high costs  
• Less transparency in contract awarding process (Nazir & Nadeem, 2015). 
However, to counter these main disadvantages, incorporating internal controls 
within all operations should be considered. Internal controls should be integrated 
throughout the organization. These internal control functions are performed by people at 
every tier of the organization. A formidable challenge for public procurement agencies is 
to conduct procurement functions with the highest level of integrity, accountability, and 
transparency (Rendon & Rendon, 2015).  
 81 
As per the GAO’s federal government internal control standards “Internal control 
is a dynamic, iterative, and integrated process in which components impact on design, 
implementation, and operating effectiveness of each other” (GAO, 2014b, p. 11). The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission (COSO) integrated 
internal control framework remains adaptive for any organization. However, the 
implementation of objectives like operations and compliance seem difficult as first one 
deals with national security and later with the regulations and industry standards. The 
defense market related factors such as technological pace, long term, budgetary aspects, 
and volatile nature (Weidenbaum, 1960, p. 21) must be kept in focus while designing and 
adapting internal controls for the defense procurement system.  
Therefore, each procurement phase must be analyzed against the vulnerabilities 
and typically associated fraud risks in the elements of financial negotiations. The 
outcome of analysis is to recommend some viable internal controls that could aid in the 
financial negotiations process for defense contracting in Pakistan.  
a. Internal Controls for Market Research 
Market research is the start of the procurement process and is mainly focused on 
increasing the procurement agency’s negotiator’s knowledge of the requirements and 
prevailing market conditions. A host of other factors like market survey and project 
planning inadequacies (Tan, 2013) leading to buyer and seller interaction also matter in 
market research at a very early stage. This early stage interaction may open doors for the 
exchange of important information for negotiations at a later stage but could lead to many 
fraud vulnerabilities and risks. The set of internal controls shown in Table 5 could be 
helpful for conducting market research as part of the financial negotiations process for 
conducting financial negotiations.  
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Table 5.   Internal Controls for Market Research 











-Market Research  
-Buyer Seller 
interaction 
- Risk of market survey 
inadequacy  
- Risk of project 
planning inadequacy 
- Need recognition 
scheme  
-Tailoring of bids 
vulnerabilities  
- Collusion of 
stakeholders 
 
- Integrity and ethical values need to 
be demonstrated by management to 
set example for all.  
- A sample structure for procurement 
authorities and responsibilities for any 
public organization needs to be given 
in PPRA ordinance. 
- Fraud and ethics training must be 
made a mandatory feature for those 
directly involved in sensitive 
procurement function like market 
research.   
- Procurement teams with clear 
segregation of duties must be formed 
with job rotation to counter any 
opportunity for fraud. 
- Use of relevant information needs to 
be ensured by best use of information 
support systems to keep a database 




Now that internal controls for the market research based on the recommended 
U.S. procurement model have been discussed, the next section focuses on internal 
controls with respect to maximizing competition.  
b. Internal Controls for Maximizing Competition 
To get best value of the product and services, maximizing open competitive 
negotiated procedures among bidders plays a lead role in public procurement. Its 
outcome is fair price and quality for public money, but it also leads to decreased 
complexity in source selection. However, excessive competition may also lead to a host 
of fraud vulnerabilities in a multi-source environment. According to research conducted 
by David (2008), “To reduce the risks of anti-competitive fraud in procurement, an 
organization should treat all potential vendors on an arm's-length and equal basis, and 
receive and handle all vendor communications in a rigorous, confidential, and transparent 
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manner.” Some recommended internal controls for maximizing competition are listed in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6.   Internal Controls for Maximizing Competition 
Phase  Financial 
Negotiations 
Process 
Associated Risks and Fraud 
Vulnerabilities 












- Inadequate or inappropriate 
and incomplete evaluation 
Criteria usage 
- Incomplete and inadequate 
consideration of special terms 
and conditions   
- Inappropriate procurement 
method  
- Contract Type 
inappropriateness  
- Inappropriate/unjustified sole 
source award scheme  
- Bid manipulation and 
splitting 
- Subcontracting fraud 
- Receipt of insufficient bids 
- Manipulation of Bids 
- Inadequate or Potential 
Suppliers not responding 
 
- A system of checks and balances 
for evaluation criteria needs to be 
implemented.  
- For public procurement agencies, a 
well devised risk assessment 
mechanism needs to be put in place 
for  detecting manipulation and 
rigging in bids. 
- Control activities like top-level 
reviews by management needs to be 
done regularly to check on sole 
source award schemes. 
- Access restriction and 
accountability for all resources and 
records need to be enforced. 
- Viable internal/ external control 
mechanisms need to be defined in 
PPRA for guidance for public 
procurement companies to hold 
negotiations in sole source and multi-
source environment. 
 
Market conditions may vary for developed and underdeveloped countries and 
accordingly impact the procurement system efforts toward maximizing competition. 
However, an efficient internal control system can provide a suitable environment not only 
for maximizing competition, but also for selecting appropriate contract types. The next 
section focuses on internal controls in the selection of appropriate contract types.  
c. Internal Controls for Appropriate Contract Type 
Due to the sensitive nature of defense requirements, the appropriate contract type 
selection plays a major role in timely meeting of defense forces’ demands. The 
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appropriate contract type is also a critical factor in the follow-on financial negotiations 
process. The shaping of source selection and solicitation planning, whether to include 
fixed-price type or cost-type contracts, would ultimately affect the operational 
preparedness of defense forces. Therefore, internal controls overlooking the fraud 
vulnerabilities and associated risks remain critical in contract type selection. Some of the 
recommended internal controls for appropriate contract type are shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7.   Internal Controls for Appropriate Contract Type  
Phase  Financial 
Negotiations 
Process 
Associated Risks & Fraud 
Vulnerabilities 


















- Incomplete and inadequate 
Consideration of Special 






Sole Source Award Scheme  
-Bid Manipulation and 
Splitting 
Subcontracting Fraud 
- Receipt of Insufficient Bids 
Manipulation of Bids 
- Inadequate or Potential 
Suppliers no responding 
 
- A guide be given in PPRA 
ordinance for the conduct of ongoing 
and separate evaluations by the 
officers to monitor appropriate 
contract awards.  
- A system of well-defined policies 
and procedures be implemented for 
provision of clear award selection 
criteria at every tier in procurement 
channel. 
- PPRA rules should define 
mechanism for communication of 
deficiencies in all Government 
departments for future guidance in 
appropriate contract type selection. 
A good information management 
system could be used for the process. 
- A system of checks and balances 
could be implemented in all phases 
of planning and source selection for 
limiting ability of contracting 
officers to commit fraud.   
 
In addition to the above mentioned internal controls, training policies on fraud 
detection and prevention and background checks of management are also needed before 
hiring personnel (Wells, 2006). An appropriate contract type would eventually lead to the 
best value procurement. The next section recommends internal controls for best value 
procurements, and cost pricing data.  
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d. Internal Controls for Best Value Procurement and Cost Pricing Data  
In the last aspect of the pre-award phase, the critical decisions for future contract 
awards take place. The path to negotiations is selected, leading to buying the most 
economical product or service not solely based on the lowest bidder offer. The cost and 
pricing data helps set the competitive range, while factors like non-recurring costs, and 
operations costs, may be considered by the management. Some recommended internal 
controls for both best value procurement and cost pricing data are shown in Table 8: 
 
Table 8.   Internal Controls for Best Value Procurement and Cost Pricing Data  
Phase  Financial 
Negotiations 
Process 
Associated Risks & Fraud 
Vulnerabilities 
Recommended Internal 


















- Established evaluation 
Criteria compliance failure 
- Conflict of Interest  
- Terms, conditions, and 
price 
- Budget insufficiency 
-Unqualified contractor 
selection 
- Negotiation failure for a 
reasonable contract 
- Inappropriate/unjustified 
sole source award scheme  
- Bid manipulation and 
splitting 
Subcontracting fraud 
- Receipt of insufficient bids 
- Bid Rigging of Bids 
 
- A rigid and effective evaluations 
criteria for review of bid proposals 
followed by a valid system of 
checks and balances needs to be 
implemented.  
- For public procurement agencies 
a well devised risk assessment 
mechanism needs to be put in 
place to uncover price billing and 
cost schemes. 
- Integrity and ethical values needs 
to be demonstrated by 
management to set example at all 
times.  
- Continuous fraud risk assessment 
for trade off and cost pricing needs 
to be done. 
- Procurement teams with clear 
segregation of duties needs to be 
formed with job rotation to counter 
any opportunity for fraud. 
 
 
The internal controls for all the elements of financial negotiations have been 
discussed, so the focus is now on negotiation exchanges. The following section covers 
internal controls in negotiations.   
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e. Internal Controls for Negotiation Exchanges  
Most negotiation exchanges occur at the award phase stage where the evaluation 
processes are completed and potential bidders are engaged in negotiations rounds for a 
better competitive range. The internal controls for negotiations are vital for success of 
subsequent contract stages and the delivery of goods or services per the contract 
specifications. Some proposed internal control for negotiation exchanges recommended 
for adaptation by defense procurement agencies under the guidelines of PPRA rules are 
shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   Internal Controls for Negotiation Exchanges  
Phase  Financial 
Negotiations 
Process 
Associated Risks & Fraud 
Vulnerabilities 




- Establishment of 
competitive range 
- Initial evaluation 
- Final evaluation 
- Negotiation 
process 
- Contract award 
recommendation 
 
- Cost overruns  
-Fluctuation of foreign 
Exchange rate  
- Schedule delay 
- Conflict of interest 
- Terms, conditions, and 
price 
- Budget insufficiency 
- Unqualified contractor 
selection 
- Substandard goods delivery 
- Unable to Reach 
Agreement on the negotiated 
settlement 
- Shell company schemes 
 
- Due to sensitivity of negotiations 
exchanges processes, setting up of an 
ethical tone at the top and culture of 
honesty is very important as source of 
ethical behavior starts at the top and 
forms the basis of a system. 
- Since it is an ongoing process so a 
mechanism be set forth in PPRA to 
devise the ongoing and separate 
evaluations for negotiation exchanges. 
- Mandatory job rotation with 
segregation of duties is vital for fraud 
deterrence.  
- A system of checks and balances for 




Any set of internal controls for a procurement system is never exhaustive. The 
best set of internal controls should be implementable, integrated, and have the capacity to 
increase the operational effectiveness of all internal control components (GAO, 2014b). 
Some of the most common internal controls may include setting up the tone at the top as 
well as  rewards and penalty measures, leading to increasing morale and loyalty among 
employees (Tan, 2013).  
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter was discussed in two parts. The first part presented the comparative 
analysis of the elements of financial negotiations of the U.S. model, the UK model and 
the UN model. Characteristics of each element of financial negotiations in these models 
were discussed. Relevant findings were deduced from the analysis to draw pertinent 
recommendations for PPRA rules 2004. This research study recommended inclusion of 
six elements of financial negotiations in the PPRA rules 2004 by adopting procedures of 
the respective models researched suitable for the existing Pakistan PPRA rules.   
In addition, to recommend a viable set of internal controls in the financial 
negotiations process for Pakistan, procurement phases, vulnerabilities within the phases, 
and typically associated fraud risks in the elements of financial negotiations were 
discussed. The application of related  internal controls for financial negotiations 
processes were also discussed. Some viable internal controls to help the financial 
negotiations process in the public procurement system, particularly in Pakistan defense, 
were presented in tabular form for better visibility for each likely fraud vulnerability. The 
most common internal controls highlighted included setting the tone at the top, 
maintaining an ethical environment in the organization, and implementing segregation of 
duties with mandatory job rotation (Tan, 2013). Recommendations based on the 
application of the related COSO internal control framework discussions were provided 
for inclusion in the Pakistan financial negotiations procurement process. 
The following chapter discusses the summary, conclusions, and areas for further 
research.   
  
 88 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 89 
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The defense sector consumes a large portion of taxpayers’ money; thus, saving 
taxpayers’ money goes hand in hand with refined public procurement methods. Pakistan 
has been continually refining the public procurements procedures through the 
manifestation of PPRA rules in all public procurements. This research study was focused 
on analyzing the financial negotiations processes for public procurement and the internal 
controls necessary to support this process. Chapter I presented a brief introduction of the 
importance and organization of this research study. Chapter II detailed the associated 
literature that forms the basis of this research.  Pakistan’s procurement management 
system as appended in PPRA was summarized followed by contract management phases. 
The elements of financial negotiations were described to lay the foundation for the 
comparative analysis of the financial negotiations process. The procurement models of 
the U.S., the UK, and the UN were reviewed with emphasis on the financial negotiations 
processes. Lastly, Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) internal control objectives, components, and principles were reviewed along 
with procurement fraud schemes in relation to internal controls. Possible fraud 
vulnerabilities and typically associated risks were also discussed. 
Chapter III discussed the methodology, sources of data, and data analysis. Chapter 
IV built on previous chapters by analyzing the financial negotiations processes of 
different procurement models and making recommendations for the Pakistani public 
procurement system. Chapter IV also discussed the internal controls required for an 
efficient and effective financial negotiations process and made recommendations 
regarding policy guidelines for Pakistan’s public procurement system in relation to the 
financial negotiations processes. 
 In this chapter, previous chapters are briefly reviewed, and answers to the 
research questions are addressed. Areas for further research are also provided for future 
research for the implementation of the financial negotiations process in Pakistan.  
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B. CONCLUSION 
This research study has focused on analyzing the financial negotiations process 
for public procurement and the internal controls necessary to support this process, thus 
leading to the summarized findings presented in the following sections. 
1. Research Questions 
The purpose of this research study was to analyze the financial negotiations 
processes for public procurement of the U.S., the UK., the UN along with a credible 
internal control framework in order to develop a guide for Pakistan’s public procurement 
system. The two questions that were addressed in this research are as follow: 
a. What processes should Pakistan put into place in order to perform 
defense related financial negotiations? 
This research study focused on the limitations of financial negotiations in the 
PPRA Rules 2004 in order to understand the procedural shortfalls. Suitable elements of 
the financial negotiations process, as discussed in CPRG Volume 1, were described in 
detail. Three contemporary procurement models, the U.S. model, the UK model, and the 
UN model, were discussed with emphasis on the financial negotiations process of each 
model. A comparative analysis of the six elements of the financial negotiations process 
was conducted: (1) market research, (2) maximizing competition, (3) appropriate contract 
type, (4) best value continuum, (5) cost and price analysis, and (6) negotiation exchanges. 
Based on the comparative analysis and findings, this research study recommends the 
PPRA rules 2004 adopt suitable changes from the appropriate models in order to monitor 
and control the financial negotiations process in Pakistan (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10.   Summary of Recommendations for Conducting Financial 
Negotiations 
Elements of Negotiations Recommendations 
Market research • Mandate market research in the PPRA rules. 
• The U.S. Model of market research may be adopted. 
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Maximizing competition • Incorporation of open competitive negotiated procedure in 
PPRA existing two-stage-two-envelope bidding process. 
• .The UNCITRAL Model Law/UK model for maximizing 
competition may be followed. 
Appropriate contract type • Incorporate cost-type contracts in PPRA rules. 
• The U.S. model of different types of contracts and their 
selection may be adopted. 
Best value continuum • Amendment in the PPRA rules to incorporate evaluation 
criteria according to the requirement. 
• The U.S. model of best value continuum may be adopted. 
Cost and price analysis • Incorporate guidance on cost and price analysis in PPRA 
rules. 
• Development of cost and price analysis expertise by the 
PPRA. 
• Standardize CAS. 
• The U.S. model on cost and price analysis may be adopted. 
Negotiation exchanges • Guidance on structured approach to conduct negotiation 
exchanges in the PPRA rules. 
• The U.S. model’s guidance on conduct of negotiations may 
be incorporated in the PPRA rules. 
 
b. What internal controls would help support the financial negotiations 
process for defense contracting in Pakistan? 
The list of internal controls required to completely address the fraud 
vulnerabilities is never exhaustive. The COSO integrated internal control framework 
remains adaptive for tailoring to the requirements of any particular organization. 
However, most important for an effective outcome is the joint applicability of the internal 
control principles to the procurement scenario for effective implementation. Each aspect 
of procurement is pitched against the vulnerabilities and typically associated fraud risks 
in the elements of financial negotiations. This results in the recommendation of some 
viable internal controls that could aid in the financial negotiations process for defense 
contracting in Pakistan (see Table 11). 
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Table 11.   Summary of Recommended Internal Controls for Financial 
Negotiations Process 
Elements of  Financial 
Negotiations    
 
Recommended Internal Controls    
 
Market research - Integrity and ethical values need to be demonstrated by management to set an 
example for all.  
- A sample structure for procurement 
authorities and responsibilities for any 
public organization needs to be given in 
PPRA ordinance. 
- Fraud and ethics training needs to be 
made a mandatory feature for those directly 
involved in sensitive procurement function 
like market research.  
- Procurement teams with clear segregation 
of duties need to be formed with job 
rotation to counter any opportunity for 
fraud commitment 
- Use of relevant information needs to be 
ensured by best use of information support 
systems to keep a database with respect to 
earlier conducted market researches. 
Maximizing competition - A system of checks and balances for evaluation criteria needs to be 
implemented.  
- For public procurement agencies, a well 
devised risk assessment mechanism needs 
to be put in place for  detecting 
manipulation and rigging in bids. 
- Control activities like top-level reviews 
by management needs to be done regularly 
to check on sole source award schemes. 
- Access restriction and accountability for 
all resources and   records needs to be 
enforced. 
- Viable internal/external control 
mechanisms need to be defined in PPRA 
for guidance for public procurement 
companies to hold negotiations in sole 
source and multi-source environment. 
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Elements of  Financial 
Negotiations    
 
Recommended Internal Controls    
 
Appropriate contract type - A guide be given in PPRA ordinance for the conduct of ongoing and separate 
evaluations by the officers to monitor 
appropriate contract awards.  
- A system of well-defined policies and 
procedures needs to be implemented for 
provision of clear award selection criteria 
at every tier in procurement channel. 
- PPRA rules should define mechanism for 
communication of deficiencies in all 
Government departments for future 
guidance in appropriate contract type 
selection. A good information management 
system could be used for the process. 
- A system of checks and balances needs to  
be implemented in all phases of planning 
and source selection for limiting ability of 
contracting officers to commit fraud.   
Best value procurement, and cost pricing 
data 
- A rigid and effective evaluations criteria 
for review of bid proposals followed by 
valid system of checks and balances need 
to be implemented.  
- For public procurement agencies a well 
devised risk assessment mechanism needs 
to be put in place to uncover price billing 
and cost schemes. 
- Integrity and ethical values need to be 
demonstrated by management to set an 
example at all times.  
- Continuous fraud risk assessment for 
trade off and cost pricing needs to be done. 
- Procurement teams with clear segregation 
of duties needs to be formed with job 
rotation to counter any opportunity for 
fraud. 
Negotiation Exchanges  - Due to sensitivity of negotiations exchanges processes, setting up of an 
ethical tone at the top and culture of 
honesty is very important as source of 
ethical behavior starts at the top and form a 
basis of a system 
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Elements of  Financial 
Negotiations    
 
Recommended Internal Controls    
 
- Since it is an ongoing process, a 
mechanism needs to be set forth in PPRA 
to devise the ongoing and separate 
evaluations for negotiation exchanges. 
- Mandatory job rotation with segregation 
of duties is vital for fraud deterrence  
- A system of checks and balances for 
conduct of negotiations needs to be 
implemented.  
 
Furthermore, most internal controls have their roots in setting the tone at the top 
level of the organization. Setting up the tone at the top leads to a code of ethics for 
implementation at every level in the organization. A sample code of ethics for U.S. 
federal government employees is in Appendix A.  
2. Areas for Further Research 
Three areas for further research are recommended. 
a. Price Analysis  
First, the cost and price analysis of submitted proposals is a prerequisite for 
successful financial negotiations. The U.S. model and the UK model have supporting 
organizations with specialties in cost and price analysis to conduct such analyses. 
Furthermore, uniform cost accounting standards are in place for the defense industry. 
PPRA lacks such supporting organization(s) for cost and price analysis and uniform 
defense accounting standards. Further research on establishing cost and price analysis 
organization(s) for PPRA is needed before the wholesale implementation of financial 
negotiations. 
b. Better Monitoring/ Oversight 
Second, the PPRA is the overall monitoring body responsible for overseeing the 
public procurement processes including defense contracts of Pakistan. The mandate of 
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the PPRA requires a dedicated internal control organization for issuing policy guidelines 
and exercising oversight of the internal controls of the procuring agency. Further research 
is needed to establish dedicated internal control organization(s) to oversee the internal 
control procedures of the procuring agencies. 
c. Understanding Elements of Financial Negotiations  
Finally, the elements of financial negotiations, like market research and types of 
contracts, hold great capacity for further refinements before implementation into 
Pakistan’s financial negotiations process and related internal controls. An in-depth study 
into each of the financial negotiations elements might improve Pakistan’s public 
procurement system. A detailed understanding of the financial negotiations elements 
would also help train procurement and internal control employees.  
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APPENDIX.  GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES CODE OF ETHICS 
Any person in government service should. 
1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to 
Government persons, party, or department. 
2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States and of 
all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion. 
3. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his 
duties his earnest effort and best thought. 
4. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks 
accomplished. 
5. Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to 
anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept for himself or his 
family, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by 
reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his governmental duties. 
6. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since a 
Government employee has no private word which can be binding on public duty. 
7. Engage in no business with the Government, either directly or indirectly which 
is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of his governmental duties. 
8. Never use any information coming to him confidentially in the performance of 
governmental duties as a means for making private profit. 
9. Expose corruption wherever discovered. 
10. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust. 
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, 2008 
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